Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases by Borgmann, Caitlin E.
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research CUNY School of Law
2010
Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional
Rights Cases
Caitlin E. Borgmann
CUNY School of Law
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CUNY School of Law at CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact
AcademicWorks@cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 1185 (2013).
01-Borgmann (Do Not Delete) 9/28/2013 9:55 AM 
 
1185 
California Law Review 
Vol. 101 October 2013 No. 5 
Copyright © 2013 by California Law Review, Inc., a California Nonprofit Corporation 
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Caitlin E. Borgmann* 
There is great confusion among scholars and courts about 
whether and when appellate courts may, or must, defer to trial 
courts’ findings of social fact in constitutional rights cases. The 
Supreme Court has never directly decided the question and indeed 
has addressed it only once, in passing. A common assumption, 
promoted by scholars and adopted as binding by some circuits, is 
that the deferential, “clearly erroneous” standard of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) does not apply to social facts. This Article 
challenges that assumption. There is nothing in the text of the rule 
that supports this conclusion. Moreover, except in certain readily 
identifiable circumstances, it makes sense for appellate courts to 
defer to trial courts’ findings of social fact. Federal bench trials are 
better suited than the appellate process to vetting social facts when 
laws are challenged as violating constitutional rights. When key 
social facts are missing from the trial record, a remand for further 
factfinding at the trial level will often be workable and appropriate. 
Since a court’s findings of social fact can determine whether 
constitutional rights claims succeed or fail, it is crucial to achieve a 
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clearer understanding of the roles and respective authority of 
appellate and trial courts in factfinding in constitutional rights cases. 
This Article sorts out the tangle of rules and precedents concerning 
appellate review of trial court factfinding in the constitutional rights 
context. It then proposes a framework for assessing whether and 
when appellate courts should defer to trial courts’ findings of social 
fact in constitutional rights cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When legislation or governmental policies are challenged in federal court 
as violating individual constitutional rights,1 federal district court judges may 
 
1.  Constitutional rights claims can arise in a variety of litigation contexts. This Article focuses 
on challenges to governmental laws or policies on the grounds that they violate individual 
constitutional rights. In this Article, references to “constitutional rights cases” are shorthand for this 
kind of claim.  
 Of course, laws and policies may be claimed constitutionally invalid for reasons other than that 
they violate individual rights. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that 
Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment to enact private 
enforcement provisions of the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (holding that Congress lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
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issue written findings of fact after preliminary injunction hearings or bench 
trials, which often occur before the law or policy goes into effect.2 The facts 
relevant to these kinds of cases are “social” facts, also commonly referred to as 
“legislative” facts.3 Case-specific or “adjudicative” facts are the “who, what, 
when, where, how, and why” facts specific to the litigants in a given case.4 In 
contrast, social facts are general facts, often predictive in nature, that have 
significance for society more broadly and that often form the basis of judicial 
rulemaking. An example of an issue of social fact is whether violent video 
games cause aggression in children.5 
Social facts have not always played an important role in determining a 
law’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court traditionally deferred to legislatures 
by assuming the factual premises underlying challenged laws, whether or not 
these facts actually existed or actually motivated the legislature.6 In some cases, 
the Court did the opposite and simply disregarded the social facts that 
established the basis for legislation. This was especially true of the economic 
legislation the Court often invalidated in the Lochner era.7 
However, the demise of the Lochner era brought an end to the court’s 
tendency to assume or disregard the factual bases for challenged laws.8 Social 
facts are now an intrinsic part of both defending a law (by justifying its social 
value) and attacking it (by showing its harmful effects). Indeed, the importance 
of weighing social facts in determining whether laws are constitutional is now 
so well accepted as to be taken for granted.9 
 
to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Much of this Article’s analysis may be relevant to 
these contexts as well. Whether and when this is so is beyond the scope of the Article. 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
3. Social facts are also the kinds of facts that legislatures “find” as part of the legislative 
process. The Supreme Court generally uses the term “legislative fact” to refer specifically to a 
legislature’s finding of social fact. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to “elected legislature’s” factual conclusions regarding 
dangers of video games as “legislative facts”); see also infra notes 41, 51. Because courts also find 
“legislative facts,” the term can therefore be confusing. To avoid this confusion, I refer to legislative 
facts as “social facts” and to adjudicative facts as “case-specific facts.” See infra Part I. 
4. 2 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201.02 (Mar. 2013); Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985). 
5. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729. 
6. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (stating that “if any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [a challenged statute], the existence of 
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”). 
7. See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 637, 642–43, 667 (1966); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 407 (1942) (discussing how “judicial decisions 
making direct and extensive use of legislative facts” remained exceptional in 1942, but had increased 
vastly since 1937). 
8. See Davis, supra note 7, at 407. 
9. See Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111, 
120–21 (1997) (noting that, whether or not they adhere to the fact or law distinction, most scholars 
today recognize the influence of social legislative facts on constitutional decision making); Ann 
Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 115–16 
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Although trial courts now regularly issue written findings of social fact 
after bench trials addressing a law’s constitutionality, the Supreme Court has 
not resolved the question of how appellate courts should treat these findings of 
fact. Normally, facts found by a federal district judge are protected on appeal 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which requires that appellate 
courts defer to federal trial judges’ findings of fact unless those findings are 
“clearly erroneous.”10 Although nothing in the rule exempts social facts from 
its scope, it is widely believed that social facts are not subject to the rule and 
that appellate courts should review them independently.11 Remarkably, 
considering the importance of social facts to constitutional rights litigation, the 
Supreme Court has neither answered the question definitively nor addressed it 
in any detail. In fact, it was not until 1986, in Lockhart v. McCree, that the 
Court first overtly suggested, in dicta, that Rule 52(a)(6) may not apply to 
findings of “legislative fact.”12 The Court has not revisited the issue since 
Lockhart. 
Despite the lack of relevant Supreme Court precedent, some federal courts 
of appeals have decisively held that social facts are subject to independent or de 
novo appellate review.13 The Supreme Court sometimes appears to follow such 
a rule tacitly, although it does not do so consistently.14 I term the exclusion of 
social facts from the scope of Rule 52(a)(6) the “social facts exception.” De 
novo review of social facts is also sometimes defended under a close cousin to 
the social facts exception known as the “constitutional fact doctrine.” This 
doctrine holds that, in order to retain authority over constitutional 
interpretation, appellate courts must review independently all factual 
determinations that are dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question in a 
case (such as whether a statement was made with “actual malice”).15 The 
Supreme Court has traditionally applied the doctrine only to case-specific (i.e., 
 
(1988) (recounting but critiquing this phenomenon); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in 
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 75 (1960) (characterizing the proposition that judges 
make constitutional law on basis of facts as “hardly earth-shaking”). 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). “Clearly erroneous” review requires the appellate court accord 
some deference to the trial court’s factfinding. This standard of review contrasts with de novo, or 
independent, review. See infra note 100 (discussing standards of review). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994); Dunagin v. 
Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion). 
12. 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 124–25. 
13. See, e.g., Singleterry, 29 F.3d at 740 (1st Cir. 1994); Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 
1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion). 
14. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134, 162–64 (2007) (noting that “[t]hree 
United States District Courts heard extensive evidence describing the [relevant abortion] procedures” 
and referring to their “exhaustive opinions in [the Court’s] own discussion of abortion procedures,” but 
dismissing the significance of agreement among these courts on the safety advantages of intact D&E 
procedure); id. at 177–79 & n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing the district courts’ consistent 
findings on intact D&E safety advantages and criticizing the majority for failing to defer); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 132–36. 
15. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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not social) facts, but commentators have suggested that it does, or should, apply 
to social facts as well.16 Although the social facts exception and the 
constitutional fact doctrine are distinct doctrines, scholars sometimes blur this 
distinction.17 
Legal scholars often repeat as dogma the proposition that social facts are 
not subject to Rule 52(a)(6).18 Indeed, virtually none have directly questioned 
the wisdom of the exception.19 But many judges and legal commentators 
remain confused about the finality of federal district courts’ findings of social 
fact.20 In the wake of Perry v. Schwarzenegger,21 in which a federal district 
judge struck down California’s ban on same-sex marriages, legal commentators 
made starkly contrasting predictions about the likely treatment of the trial 
court’s findings of fact on appeal. Some declared that Judge Vaughn Walker’s 
numerous findings would insulate the decision on appeal because the “clearly 
erroneous” standard would apply,22 while others maintained that the nature of 
the facts found made it unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would defer.23 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel seemed uncertain about how the facts should be 
treated, although it ultimately sidestepped the question.24 
 
16. See id. 
17. See, e.g., Bryan Adamson, Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race 
Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16–17 & n.71 (2009); 
see also infra note 23. 
18. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 17, at 17 n.71. 
19. But see Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 
84 IND. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2009); see also Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Extra-
Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011) (mentioning Rule 52(a)(6) only briefly, but criticizing 
appellate extra-record factfinding and suggesting reforms). 
20. See, e.g., McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The precise fit of 
the clearly erroneous standard of review and our duty to make ‘an independent judgment on the facts 
of the case’ . . . is not altogether clear.”) (citation omitted), aff’d, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
21. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
22. See, e.g., Mark Ambinder, Prop 8 Overturned: The Facts, Not the Law, Matter, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/08/prop-8-overturned-
the-facts-not-the-law-matter/60957; Andrew Koppelman, Power in the Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/4/gay-marriage-and-the-constitution/judge-
walkers-factual-findings; Dahlia Lithwick, A Brilliant Ruling, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/08/a_brilliant_ruling.html. 
23. Dave Hoffman, There Are Facts, and Then There Are Constitutional Facts, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Aug. 5, 2010, 1:07 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/08/there-are-
facts-and-then-there-are-constitutional-facts.html; see also Orin Kerr, How Much Do the Factual 
Findings Matter in Perry v. Schwarzenegger?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2010, 2:42 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/08/05/how-much-do-the-factual-findings-matter-in-perry-v-
schwarzenegger. Hoffman’s post reflects a common confusion or blurring between social (or 
“legislative”) facts and constitutional facts. See infra Part II.A. Here he seems to use the term to mean 
social facts, not constitutional facts in the sense in which the Supreme Court usually uses this term. Id. 
24. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1075–76 (referring to Rule 52(a)(6) but expressing uncertainty as to 
whether the district judge’s findings of social fact were best characterized as “adjudicative” or 
“legislative” and whether the “clearly erroneous” standard should apply). 
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I propose a clear-cut solution to all the confusion. Appellate courts should 
straightforwardly apply Rule 52(a)(6) to social facts. This approach is 
consistent with the language and intent of the rule.25 It also reinforces the 
judiciary’s critical role as a protector of constitutional rights against 
majoritarian oppression.26 When legislatures “find facts” to support legislation 
that encroaches on constitutional rights, especially when these rights are 
controversial or involve a hot-button social issue, this factfinding is often 
biased and unreliable.27 Constitutional rights claimants look to the federal 
courts as a forum for dispassionate, independent review of the relevant social 
facts.28 
Trial courts are well positioned to perform this function.29 Trial judges are 
able to observe and even question expert witnesses as they testify, helping them 
judge the credibility of expert testimony and assisting in the process of learning 
about often complex and unfamiliar topics.30 Moreover, evidence at trial—even 
when it relates to social facts—is generally subjected to a screening process, 
including rules of admissibility, that helps to ensure the integrity of the facts in 
the record.31 
Appellate courts, on the other hand, do not share these advantages. The 
absence of formal rules governing factfinding at the appellate level means that 
appellate courts’ “factfinding” is often less a search for the truth than for good 
rhetorical sound bites to support a court’s favored outcome.32 Moreover, even 
when an appellate court’s objective is the truth, the facts that enter the case at 
the appellate level are too unreliable and prone to bias to assist effectively in 
that endeavor.33 Advocacy groups and others submit amicus briefs at the 
appellate level that contain all kinds of factual assertions unvetted by the 
 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 176–85.  
26. See infra Part II.C. 
27. See Borgmann, supra note 19; see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (expressing concern that the legislature, in passing law banning 
violent video games, failed to consider evidence showing no relationship or a negative relationship 
between violent video game play and increases in aggressive thoughts and behavior), aff’d, 469 F.3d 
641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
28. See Borgmann, supra note 19; see also infra Part III.A. 
29. See infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
30. See Borgmann, supra note 19. 
31. See id. 
32. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 25 (2008); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2012) (discussing Supreme Court’s reliance on Internet research and 
identifying three uses of social facts: “facts that go to the practical consequences of the decisions, facts 
that are a critical part of the doctrinal inquiry, and facts which are used rhetorically”); see also 
Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 1007 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the 
emotionally-charged congressional testimony of a nurse who was not called to testify at any of the 
dozen or so trials on “partial-birth abortion” and declaring that “[t]he question whether States have a 
legitimate interest in banning the procedure does not require additional authority”). 
33. See infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
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adversary process.34 In addition, Supreme Court justices and appellate judges 
freely turn to their own research, including Internet searches.35 This informal, 
unscreened factfinding deprives the parties of the opportunity to contest or 
develop facts “found” by the appellate court.36 There is no reason to think that 
this system is better at resolving social fact disputes than the tried-and-true 
process of a trial. 
 In short, the pat assumption that social facts should be independently 
reviewed, while adjudicative facts merit the deference of the “clearly 
erroneous” standard, does not hold up under scrutiny. A likely reason why the 
Supreme Court has never definitively declared Rule 52(a)(6) inapplicable to all 
social factfinding is that such a rule seems too rigid. The Justices surely sense 
that, at times, deference is appropriate. Yet no court or scholar has articulated a 
more nuanced rule as to when deference is appropriate and when it is not. That 
is the goal of this Article.37 The Article is divided into three parts. Part I lays 
the groundwork for understanding appellate review of social facts. It first 
reviews the most common fact classifications and their significance, and next 
describes the general appellate standard of review for trial judge factfinding, 
the “clearly erroneous” standard. It then discusses the two main justifications 
for exempting social facts from this standard: the social facts exception and the 
constitutional fact doctrine. Part II identifies and interrogates the various 
rationales underlying the social facts exception and the constitutional fact 
doctrine and concludes that none is sufficient to justify excluding social facts 
from Rule 52(a)(6). Finally, Part III proposes a framework for appellate review 
of social facts that incorporates the “clearly erroneous” standard. 
I. 
CURRENT APPELLATE TREATMENT OF SOCIAL FACTS 
A. Separating Fact from Fact 
Given the importance of facts to litigation in general and to constitutional 
litigation in particular, it is surprising how rarely the Supreme Court has 
 
34. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 4–5, 7–8. 
35. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 32, at 1260–61.  
36. See infra text accompanying notes 207–13. 
37. This Article’s primary focus is on what happens when a trial court has already created a 
trial record and issued findings of social fact in a constitutional rights case. At this point, the appellate 
court must decide how to deal with this factual record. See John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief – 
Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1993). The Article argues that trial courts possess significant structural advantages 
over appellate courts in examining constitutional social facts. But there is clearly a limit to what facts 
can be developed through this time-consuming and resource-intensive mechanism. Judicial economy 
and common sense dictate, and constitutional principles allow, a certain amount of extra-record 
factfinding on very general social facts that are not hotly contested and not pivotal to the outcome. See 
infra notes 232–36. Where exactly these boundaries lie is not fully developed in this Article, which 
focuses on the more difficult issues presented by contested social facts. 
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discussed the different types of facts and their treatment. The term 
“constitutional fact”—a subject of great interest among legal scholars38— 
appears in fewer than twenty reported Supreme Court opinions.39 The term 
“legislative fact” has been mentioned in only about two dozen reported 
Supreme Court opinions40 and generally does not denote a particular kind of 
fact but rather identifies its source.41 These shorthand references have typically 
lacked extensive discussion or explanation. 
Many scholars have jumped in to fill the gaps left by the Court’s failure to 
address the categories and treatment of different kinds of facts. A common 
vocabulary of fact classifications has developed, but different scholars and 
judges use the same terms in widely diverging ways.42 Perhaps the most 
recognized classification divides facts into “adjudicative” and “legislative” 
facts, terms Kenneth Culp Davis coined in a 1942 article.43 According to Davis, 
“adjudicative facts” are “facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties 
did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were.”44 
Courts and scholars now commonly use the term “adjudicative facts” to refer to 
the “who, what, when, where, how” facts particular to the litigants in a case.45 
 
38. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 32; Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and 
Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1957); Monaghan, supra note 4, at 235. 
39. A recent search for the phrase “constitutional fact” in Westlaw’s Supreme Court opinions 
database yielded eighteen documents. Not all of these are majority opinions, and sometimes the term 
appears only as part of the title of a cited secondary authority. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 
U.S. 99, 115 (1995) (citing Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 273–76 
(1985)). In contrast, the same query in Westlaw’s law journal database yielded 1,112 documents. 
40. A recent search for the phrase “legislative fact” yielded 26 documents in Westlaw’s 
Supreme Court opinions database, as contrasted with 1,780 documents in the law journal database. 
41. The Supreme Court has generally used the term “legislative fact” to mean a fact found or 
considered by a legislature or an administrative agency. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 315 (1993); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992). 
42. A striking example of this is Bryan Adamson’s taxonomy. Adamson uses the term 
“adjudicative-legislative fact” to refer to “[l]egislative facts [that also] serve an adjudicatory function 
within a particular legal controversy.” Adamson, supra note 17, at 14–15. Adamson’s overlapping 
definition contrasts with Kenneth C. Davis’s sharp demarcation between legislative and adjudicative 
facts, which is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 201’s admonition that it “governs judicial notice 
of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.” FED. R. EVID. 201(a). Adamson asserts that while 
“Rule 201 speaks explicitly only of judicial notice of adjudicative facts and does not explicitly mention 
legislative facts[,] . . . [l]egislative facts, particularly those which decide case-specific outcomes, are in 
one sense ‘adjudicative,’ and they can be judicially noticed.” Bryan Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025, 1061–62 (2007); see also 
Adamson, supra note 17, at 15 n.60 (“Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows for judicial notice of a 
legislative fact.”). 
43. Davis, supra note 7, at 402–03; see Karst, supra note 9, at 77 n.9 (stating that the phrase 
“legislative fact” “virtually belongs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis”).  
44. Davis, supra note 7, at 402–03. 
45. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, § 201.02 (“‘Adjudicative facts’ are simply the facts of 
a particular case that ordinarily go to the jury. They concern the issues of who did what, where, when, 
how, and with what motive or intent. They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, and 
their businesses.”); Monaghan, supra note 4, at 235 (describing “adjudicative facts” as “who, when, 
what, and where” facts). 
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In a case concerning employment discrimination, a question of adjudicative 
fact might be whether the plaintiff was actually qualified for the job. Such facts 
are also sometimes referred to as “historical”46 or “case-specific”47 facts. 
By “legislative facts,” Davis means “facts which are utilized for informing 
a court’s legislative judgment on questions of law and policy.”48 As examples, 
Davis offers the following factual conclusions from a labor dispute case: a 
finding that “the object of collective bargaining has long been an agreement 
evidenced by a signed contract or statement in writing,” facts “[c]oncerning the 
growth and extent of signed agreements,” and a finding that “refusals to sign 
written contracts ‘have proved fruitful sources of dissatisfaction and 
disagreement’” in labor relations.49 Davis points out that, for these statements, 
the Court “did not limit itself to the record” but instead relied upon a variety of 
extra-record sources, including textbooks, articles, and publications of the 
National Labor Relations Board.50 
Notwithstanding its widespread use, Davis’s terminology is problematic 
for several reasons. First, the term “legislative fact” is ambiguous in that it is 
sometimes used to mean facts found by a legislative body.51 Second, Davis’s 
terms assume a clearer distinction between the two types of fact than always 
exists.52 Third, the terminology is question begging, in that the labels 
presuppose the distinct treatment Davis argues each type of fact should 
receive.53 
I use the terms “social fact” and “case-specific fact” as the rough 
equivalents of Davis’s “legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact.” Social facts 
are general facts about the world, often based on social scientific evidence and 
often encompassing predictions that underlie policymaking in legislative and 
other contexts.54 Social facts also inform courts’ judgments as to whether laws 
 
46. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45 (1977). 
47. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 46. 
48. Davis, supra note 7, at 404; see also Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 
(7th Cir. 1982) (“legislative facts” are “those general considerations that move a lawmaking or rule 
making body to adopt a rule”). 
49. Davis, supra note 7, at 405 (quoting H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941)).  
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 41; Borgmann, supra note 19, at 3 n.8 (using the term in 
this manner). In the broader sense in which Kenneth Culp Davis uses the term, “legislative facts” may 
be found by legislatures, but they may also be found by administrative bodies or courts. See, e.g., 
Peggy C. Davis, ‘There Is a Book Out . . . ’: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1600 (1987) (using “legislative fact-finding” to refer to a court’s findings of 
“legislative facts”). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
53. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (1986); see also FAIGMAN, supra 
note 32, at 146 (identifying “a degree of circularity” in Davis’s taxonomy, in that “[t]he very same fact 
might be described as adjudicative, because it was part of a jury’s deliberations, and legislative, 
because a lawmaker used it to form or interpret the law”); see infra text accompanying notes 284–87. 
54. See HOROWITZ, supra note 46, at 45 (defining “social facts” as “the recurrent patterns of 
behavior on which policy must be based”); THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND 
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or policies are constitutional. One example of a question of social fact might be 
whether certain employment screening tests tend to exclude members of a 
constitutionally protected class. Another example is whether children are 
harmed when raised by gay or lesbian parents, an inquiry that may move a 
legislature to adopt a law protecting or banning same-sex marriages, or prompt 
a court to find that such marriages are or are not protected by the Constitution. 
As the label suggests, case-specific facts are those facts particular to the 
parties and controversies before the court. Of course, the line separating case-
specific and social facts is somewhat fluid.55 Some case-specific facts are 
simply narrower versions of social facts. For example, a statement of social fact 
might be, “Generally the D&E abortion is the safest method of abortion in the 
second trimester of pregnancy.”56 A version of the same social fact statement, 
framed in a more case-specific way, would be, “A D&E abortion is the safest 
method of abortion for Plaintiff Jane Doe.” Social facts are sometimes framed 
in ways that fall in between these two extremes—for example, “The safest 
method of second-trimester abortion performed in the state of Virginia is the 
D&E abortion.” 
The concept of a “social fact” is quite capacious. Some legal theorists, for 
example, hold the view that all law is a social fact.57 It is therefore helpful to 
subdivide social facts into two categories, which I refer to as “constitutive 
social facts” and “dispositive social facts.”58 Constitutive social facts are facts 
that constitute or establish legal rules.59 Dispositive social facts, in contrast, are 
the plainly empirical questions courts must resolve before determining a law’s 
constitutionality: Does a particular protocol for lethal injection cause intense 
 
LAWYERS 184 (1978) (same). In recognition of social facts’ function in shaping public policy, 
Professor Robert E. Keeton calls them “premise facts.” Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and 
Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988). 
55. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 114 (“The line between adjudicative and 
legislative facts is indistinct . . . because decision makers use even the most particularized facts to 
make legal rules.”). 
56. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 804 (E.D. Va. 1998); see 
also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 297 n.9 (1978) (addressing whether 
exposure to asbestos causes lung cancer). 
57. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003) (“[T]he concepts ‘law’ and ‘fact’ do not denote distinct ontological 
categories; rather, legal questions are part of the more general category of factual questions.”); John O. 
McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008) 
(“There is no analytic dichotomy between law and fact. Law is a social fact . . . .”). 
58. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 5. David Faigman employs two similar categories, 
doctrinal facts and reviewable facts. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 46 (“Constitutional doctrinal facts are 
advanced to substantiate a particular interpretation of the Constitution.”); id. at 170 (“Reviewable facts 
are general in nature and transcend particular disputes.”). The term “reviewable facts” presumably 
reflects Faigman’s view that appellate courts should review such facts independently rather than 
applying Rule 52(a)(6)’s “clearly erroneous” standard. 
59. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 57, at 1790–97. 
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pain?60 Have there been documented cases of voter fraud in a state?61 Do 
violent video games cause aggression?62 
My focus in this Article is on dispositive social facts, and references to 
“social facts” herein are to these facts. When parties challenge laws or 
governmental policies as unconstitutional, they generally seek prospective, 
injunctive relief. In such cases, case-specific facts are generally not as relevant 
as the broader factual issues entailing predictions of a law’s effects on society 
or certain groups within it, and the social conditions that demonstrate the law’s 
importance to the public welfare.63 Dispositive social facts are also the ones 
that have sown the most confusion in both case law and legal scholarship.64 
The uncertainty over judicial treatment of dispositive social facts is 
reflected in the absence of any agreed-upon system for introducing and 
evaluating such facts. Dispositive social facts in constitutional rights cases, to 
the extent they are the subject of formal factfinding, are generally found by 
district court judges following preliminary injunction hearings65 or bench 
trials.66 At the trial level, judges tend to screen the facts for admissibility 
following the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially in bench trials, and they 
issue findings of fact as called for by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).67 
District judges follow these protocols in spite of some commentators’ 
assertions that the protocols do not apply to social facts.68 
But social facts also enter into constitutional litigation from multiple other 
sources, unlike case-specific facts, which are (theoretically) limited to the 
evidence that the parties’ lawyers introduce at the trial level.69 Social facts may 
come from the trial court record, but they may also stem from a wide range of 
other sources. As David Faigman points out, 
Proof of reviewable [social] facts comes to a court’s attention in many 
ways. It is proffered through expert testimony, embedded in record 
 
60. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
61. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
62. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
63. See Davis, supra note 7, at 404. 
64. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 151 (“By far the most difficult situation is presented by 
constitutional reviewable [i.e., social] facts, a category that includes the vast majority of facts in 
constitutional cases.”). 
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
66. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 45. Of course, in federal criminal trials and in civil trials 
involving damages claims, a right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 
respectively. However, the facts that juries find are generally case-specific facts. Id. at 121 (noting that 
even these facts “will very often lie outside the jury’s proper function” because of the courts’ “elevated 
responsibility to oversee jury fact-finding in constitutional cases”). 
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1), (2) (requiring written findings of fact for both trials and 
interlocutory hearings). 
68. See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
69. This is not to say that reviewing courts always refrain from making their own case-specific 
findings of fact. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–80 (2007) (substituting lower courts’ 
interpretation of videotaped evidence with its own). 
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transcripts of legislative or administrative agency hearings, argued in 
the briefs and memoranda of the parties and amici, and discovered 
through independent judicial research. Moreover, reviewable facts are 
introduced and analyzed at every level of court. Historically, there has 
been no practice or tradition that reviewable facts originate first at trial, 
meet any particular threshold admissibility requirements, or otherwise 
survive the rigors of the adversarial process.70 
This Article questions the appropriateness of this haphazard approach. 
Some commentators have questioned whether constitutional rights should 
depend on social facts at all.71 There may well be merit to the idea that 
constitutional rights should not hinge on the latest expert opinion on hot-button 
social issues. And certainly, the Supreme Court has sometimes relied on social 
science evidence when the need for it was debatable. Two of the Supreme 
Court’s most famous constitutional rights decisions purported to rely on such 
evidence. 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court asserted that racial 
segregation promotes a sense of inferiority in black children that inhibits their 
learning.72 The Court defended the claim as “amply supported by modern 
authority” and, in a famous footnote, cited several psychological studies 
including Kenneth Clark’s “doll” study.73 In Roe v. Wade, the Court recounted 
a long litany of social and historical evidence about public attitudes toward and 
legal regulation of abortion as well as the comparative safety of abortion and 
childbirth.74 In both decisions, the social science “evidence” likely did not 
influence the establishment of constitutional doctrine but instead served as 
neutral-sounding cover for Justices acutely aware of wading into a contentious 
 
70. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 170. 
71. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 168 (1955) (warning of 
the “potential danger” that the Court’s citation of social science in invalidating racial segregation could 
set a precedent in equal protection cases that “complaining parties [must offer] competent proof that 
they would sustain or had sustained some permanent (psychological or other kind of) damage”); Libby 
Adler, Just the Facts: The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 
UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1 (2011) (making similar arguments with respect to lesbian and gay 
rights). 
72. 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 & n.11 (1954); see Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in 
Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
793, 803–09 (2002) (recounting debate over Court’s use of this evidence). 
73. See Cahn, supra note 71, at 161–65 (describing and critiquing Clark’s study). 
74. 410 U.S. 113, 129–52 (1973). Commentators have criticized Roe for including this 
evidence. See, e.g., Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary 
System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 
1211–13 (1975). To the extent much of this evidence concerns the history of the legal regulation of 
abortion, it is not so clear that this falls outside of the proper purview of an appellate court. See Larsen, 
supra note 32, at 1260. But cf. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 89–91 (describing cases in which the 
Supreme Court made claims of historical “fact” that were “ideologically driven, not empirically 
demonstrated”). As for the facts concerning the medical safety of abortion and childbirth, it is not clear 
whether Texas contested these facts.  
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social debate.75 While there are certainly cases that turn on social scientific 
evidence, courts may risk their legitimacy when they use such evidence as a 
veneer for a decision that turns instead on moral values, “common sense,” or 
other non-scientific considerations.76 
Other than in constitutional cases in which social science evidence plays a 
more rhetorical than determinative role, courts will inevitably consider social 
facts when deciding whether a law is constitutional, because they must evaluate 
the state’s asserted justifications for passing the law.77 The government must 
try to justify a deprivation of rights as rationally related to a legitimate 
interest,78 or substantially related to an important purpose,79 or narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling interest,80 or whatever the relevant standard 
requires. These justifications invariably consist of factual claims: that 
advertising on vehicles is distracting to other drivers,81 or that capital 
punishment will have a deterrent effect.82 Overcoming the government’s 
justification necessarily entails attacking the factual assertions. Courts must 
also examine social facts in assessing the predicted effects of a law, such as 
whether and how an abortion restriction will affect women’s access to the 
procedure.83 
“Constitutional fact” is another category of facts often discussed in 
connection with constitutional rights. Like the terms “legislative fact” and 
“adjudicative fact,” the term “constitutional fact” is used commonly but with 
 
75. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 155 (arguing that, for Justices seeking to avoid 
controversy, “[s]cience possesses the mien of neutrality, rather than the stink of judicial activism”); 
Cahn, supra note 71, at 157–58 (praising the social and constitutional importance of Brown but 
remarking on danger that Court’s citation of “flimsy” social science evidence might foster false 
impression that “the outcome, either entirely or in major part, was caused by the testimony and 
opinions of the scientists”). 
76. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 71, at 157–58 (asserting that detrimental effects of segregation 
are a matter of common sense rather than science); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 165; Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the Abortion 
Controversy, 17 J. L. & POL’Y 15, 55 (2008). 
77. See, e.g., Alfange, supra note 7, at 644; Miller & Barron, supra note 74, 1234–35 n.120. 
78. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 & n.6 (1993). The burden 
of proof is normally borne by the challenger, not the government, in a rational basis case. Id. 
Nevertheless, the government is often called upon to present a factual justification for legislation 
subject to rational basis review, especially where the Court recognizes an important right is at stake but 
is reluctant to give it “suspect classification” status. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534–38 (1973). I have argued elsewhere that requiring such a factual justification even under 
rational basis review is an important way to ensure constitutional accountability among legislative 
bodies. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 10–11, 37–38; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures 
Constitutionally Accountable Through Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 564 (2009). 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
80. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767 (1997). 
81. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
82. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.31 (1976). 
83. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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little consistency.84 At its most general, the term “constitutional fact” refers to 
the full range of facts that may arise in constitutional cases.85 David Faigman 
categorizes “constitutional facts” into “doctrinal,” “reviewable,” and “case-
specific” facts.86 Indeed, as Faigman’s taxonomy recognizes, the full panoply 
of facts can crop up in constitutional rights cases.87 A somewhat narrower 
definition identifies a “constitutional fact” as one that “embod[ies] explicit and 
implicit principles of the Constitution.”88 In his famous 1942 article 
distinguishing “adjudicative” from “legislative” facts, Kenneth Culp Davis 
implies that constitutional facts are simply a subcategory of “legislative” 
facts.89 
Courts and scholars have sometimes employed a still more circumscribed 
conception of “constitutional facts” that refers to facts in constitutional cases 
that serve as “ultimate facts.”90 Ultimate facts are also commonly referred to as 
mixed questions of law and fact.91 In an often-cited article, Henry Monaghan 
uses the term “constitutional fact” in this manner, to mean facts that are 
determinative of whether a constitutional violation has occurred.92 For 
example, in Monaghan’s usage, whether the defendant in a defamation case 
acted with “actual malice” is a question of constitutional fact.93 Although it 
appears to be a question of fact and not law, an affirmative answer decides the 
constitutional question. This is the case-specific type of ultimate fact to which 
the Supreme Court has most often referred on those few occasions when it has 
expressly invoked the term “constitutional fact.”94 Although the Supreme 
Court’s usage is generally limited to case-specific facts, ultimate constitutional 
facts can also appear in the form of social facts. An example of such a 
constitutional fact is the finding that a state abortion restriction imposes an 
“undue burden” on women seeking abortions.95 Because appellate courts 
exercise de novo review over questions of law, many commentators argue, 
 
84. See, e.g., Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1434–35 (2001) (describing two distinct uses of the 
term “constitutional fact”). 
85. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 403 (“Often referred to as ‘social and economic data,’ 
constitutional facts are those which assist a court in forming a judgment on a question of constitutional 
law.”). 
86. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 46–49. 
87. Id. 
88. See Adamson, supra note 17, at 13; see also id. at 3 (“Constitutional facts are those which 
incorporate or directly compel the application of constitutional principles.”). 
89. See Davis, supra note 7, at 404–05. 
90. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing an “ultimate fact” 
as “a question of fact [that] is, at the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in th[e] case”). 
91. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16 (1982). 
92. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 230 & n.16. 
93. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501–02 (1984). 
94. See infra Part I.B.3. 
95. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (adopting and 
explaining undue burden standard). 
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appellate courts must review ultimate constitutional facts independently.96 The 
Supreme Court has adopted this view at least with respect to certain types of 
constitutional claims.97 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) and Its Exceptions 
1. The “Clearly Erroneous” Standard 
It is generally understood that federal appellate courts must conduct an 
independent or de novo review of any issues of law, while deferring to a trial 
court’s findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous.”98 The requirement 
for appellate deference to the district judge’s factfinding after bench trials or 
preliminary injunction hearings is found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a)(6), which was originally adopted in 1935.99 This rule provides, “Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”100 
The Supreme Court has not provided detailed guidance as to what makes a 
finding “clearly erroneous,” but the standard is understood to require 
significant deference to the trial judge. According to the Court, “[a] finding is 
‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”101 On the other hand, the Court has stated that 
 
 96. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. 
Bhagwat et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007) (No. 05-1382). 
 97. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 98. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). Whether appellate courts should defer to jury factfinding in 
constitutional rights cases is a complicated question. Scholars have made compelling arguments both 
for and against appellate deference in such cases. Compare Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment 
Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007) (arguing generally for appellate court deference to 
jury factfinding), with FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 122 (arguing that, in constitutional rights cases, 
appellate courts should not defer to jury factfinding because the “jury’s role [in representing the 
community] clashes with the countermajoritarian values guaranteed by the Constitution”). Jury 
factfinding is generally limited to case-specific facts. See supra note 45. This Article addresses only 
appellate review of a trial judge’s findings of social fact. 
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). Other appellate standards of review include independent or de 
novo review, the wholly non-deferential standard applied to questions of law, Salve Regina Coll., 499 
U.S. at 231–32, and “abuse of discretion,” the deferential standard of review applied to a district 
court’s evidentiary rulings, including a decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence, Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1997). See generally STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. 
DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 15.01–15.12 (2d ed. 1992) (cataloging and explaining 
various standards of review). Some commentators distinguish between de novo and independent 
appellate review, claiming that the former merely permits a court to conduct a plenary review of the 
facts, whereas the latter, in cases of constitutional fact, demands it. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 17, 
at 24. I use the terms “de novo” and “independent” review interchangeably, since neither requires 
deference to the trial court. 
101. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  
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appellate courts should let factual determinations stand if they are “plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety.”102 Both courts and commentators 
have criticized the “clearly erroneous” standard as murky and malleable,103 but 
there is no question that the rule was intended to endow trial judges with 
general authority over factfinding.104 George Christie has described this grant 
of authority over factfinding as “the transference . . . of some of the attributes 
of the jury to trial courts sitting without juries.”105 
The trial judge’s opportunity to assess a witness’s demeanor is one 
obvious reason for the deference Rule 52(a)(6) requires. In light of this 
structural advantage, and the rule’s express reference to witness credibility, 
appellate courts were once divided over whether the “clearly erroneous” 
standard applies to documentary evidence and findings deduced or inferred 
from undisputed evidence, where demeanor assessments are not relevant.106  
The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that the “clearly 
erroneous” standard applies even where witness credibility is not at issue: 
In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district 
court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in 
mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. . . . 
This is so even when the district court’s findings do not rest on 
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or 
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.107 
Moreover, the Court has clarified that the “clearly erroneous” standard applies 
to all facts and “does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain 
categories of factual findings . . . [or] divide facts into categories.”108 In 1985, 
the rule was amended to clarify that it applies not just to oral testimony but also 
to documentary and “other” evidence.109  
 
102. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible 
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citing 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 
U.S. 844 (1982))). 
103. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395; Adamson, supra note 42, at 1051 (“‘clearly 
erroneous’ . . . has proven to be the most fugitive of terms to define”); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 
52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 
645 (1988) (“[T]he ‘clearly erroneous’ phrase has no intrinsic meaning. It is elastic, capacious, 
malleable, and above all variable.”). This Article attempts to ameliorate this problem by providing 
more specific factors to help courts determine whether a trial court’s findings of social fact are clearly 
erroneous. See infra Part III.B.2. 
104. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 233; Adamson, supra note 42, at 1043. 
105. George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 52 
(1992). 
106. See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. 
REV. 751, 764–65 (1957). 
107. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). The Court did note, however, that “even greater deference” is owed to a trial 
judge’s credibility determinations. Id. at 575. 
108. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) advisory committee’s note. 
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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the 
basic division of responsibility between district courts and courts of appeals in 
Landell v. Sorrell: 
[O]ur system of judicial review provides plaintiffs the opportunity to 
present competing evidence [challenging the legislature’s factfinding], 
assigns to the District Court the responsibility for making findings of 
fact . . . after weighing the evidence, and leaves to the Court of 
Appeals the independent responsibility to assess the legal significance 
of these factual findings. 110 
Rule 52(a)(6) allocates courts’ roles and authority based on three values: 
efficiency, stability, and institutional competence. The note to the rule 
expressly references the first two of these. It states that “recognizing that the 
trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts” promotes 
the “public interest in . . . stability and judicial economy,” as well as “the 
legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants.”111 It would be 
tremendously inefficient if litigants were forced to litigate factual issues not 
only at trial but again at the intermediate appellate level and before the 
Supreme Court.112 Moreover, having the factual issues determined by a trial 
court leaves appellate courts free to focus on legal issues.113 Duplicative 
factfinding is unlikely to increase accuracy.114 At the same time, de novo fact 
review would likely multiply appeals and undermine public confidence in trial 
courts’ decisions,115 which would be problematic given that, “[u]nder any 
feasible or conceivable system, our trial courts must always have the last word 
in the great bulk of cases.”116 Independent appellate review would also create 
uncertainty, since factfinding procedures at the appellate level are not nearly as 
well defined and routine as in the district courts.117 
 
110. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 114 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), rev’d on other 
grounds, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). The Court of Appeals in Landell nevertheless went on to conduct an 
“independent review” of whether the evidence supported the trial court’s findings, although it relied 
for this review on the legislative and trial record. Id. at 116–19, 124. Given the potentially competing 
rights of voters and speakers at issue in Landell, some level of closer appellate scrutiny, if not 
necessarily de novo review, may have been appropriate. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 39; infra 
note 384. Moreover, the case demonstrates that “independent review” does not necessarily entail the 
need to go beyond the trial record to engage in extra-record “factfinding” at the appellate level. See 
infra Part III.B.2. 
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note. 
112. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. 
113. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (“With the record having been 
constructed below and settled for purposes of the appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their 
primary attention to legal issues.”). 
114. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. 
115. Pendergrass v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950); see also Wright, 
supra note 106, at 779 (citing Pendergrass). 
116. Wright, supra note 106, at 781. 
117. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 43–46. 
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In addition to promoting efficiency and stability, Rule 52(a)(6) recognizes 
trial courts’ superior factfinding competence.118 Trial judges have the 
advantage of hearing the witnesses’ courtroom testimony, of having sustained 
exposure to the case, and of making “the initial sifting of the entire record and 
[putting] it into logical sequence.”119 This way of experiencing the facts differs 
from that of appellate courts, where “lawyers . . . pick[] . . . out bits and pieces 
of the record to attack or defend a particular finding.”120 
Notwithstanding Rule 52(a)(6) and its underlying rationales, the Supreme 
Court has stated or implied that appellate courts in certain contexts must 
disregard the “clearly erroneous” standard and instead exercise independent 
review over trial court factfinding.121 Two of the most significant examples are 
the social facts exception and the constitutional fact doctrine. 
2. The Social Facts Exception 
In light of the Supreme Court’s explications in cases like Anderson v. 
Bessemer City and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, as well as the 1985 rule 
amendment, it might seem clear that Rule 52(a)(6) applies to all types of 
district court factual findings.122 However, in practice, the Supreme Court’s and 
appellate courts’ application of the rule is hardly this lucid.123 In particular, the 
Supreme Court itself seems uncertain of the rule’s relevance to social facts. 
The Court has suggested, but never directly ruled, that the “clearly 
erroneous” standard does not apply to trial court findings of social fact. This 
suggestion appeared in a footnote in Lockhart v. McCree,124 in which the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit the removal for 
cause of prospective jurors who strongly oppose the death penalty.125 The trial 
court had issued findings of social fact concluding that such removal produces 
 
118. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 233 (noting the rule’s “deference to the unchallenged 
superiority of the district court’s factfinding ability”); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (noting that “[t]he 
trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes 
expertise”). 
119. Wright, supra note 106, at 782. 
120. Id.; see infra Part II.B. 
121. See generally Adamson, supra note 42 (discussing appellate courts’ uneven application of 
Rule 52(a)); Cooper, supra note 103, at 655 (discussing malleability of “clearly erroneous” standard). 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 107–09. 
123. For example, notwithstanding the rule’s express language including documentary 
evidence within its scope, “[s]ome appellate courts have maintained that when a trial court’s factual 
findings do not rest on demeanor evidence and evaluation of a witness’ credibility, heightened review 
is permissible.” Adamson, supra note 42, at 1049; see also id. at 1054–62 (documenting many other 
contexts in which appellate courts have found their way around strictly applying the Rule 52(a)(6) 
standard of review to trial court factfinding); John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review 
in Federal Appellate Courts—Is the “Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L. REV. 
409 (1981) (describing instances in which courts have avoided application of the clearly erroneous 
rule). 
124. 476 U.S. 162, 168–69 n.3 (1986). 
125. Id. at 173. 
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juries more prone to convict capital defendants than juries that have not been 
“death qualified” in this way.126 The Supreme Court disclaimed the need to 
determine these facts’ validity, asserting that they had no bearing on its 
decision, but added: 
We are far from persuaded, however, that the “clearly erroneous” 
standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of “legislative” facts at issue 
here . . . . The difficulty with applying such a standard to “legislative” 
facts is evidenced here by the fact that at least one other Court of 
Appeals reviewing the same social science studies . . . has reached a 
conclusion contrary to that of the Eighth Circuit.127 
Although it denied that social facts were important to its holding, the Court 
undertook a close and critical examination of the studies the defendant relied 
upon, explaining why it was not persuaded that this evidence supported his 
claim that death qualification results in juries predisposed to convict.128 
Beyond this brief suggestion in Lockhart that a social facts exception may 
be warranted, the Supreme Court has often seemed to assume such an 
exception in its treatment of social facts, engaging in de novo and extra-record 
fact review at will.129 The Court typically offers no elucidation of why social 
facts should be treated differently. Indeed, the Court generally does not even 
refer to Rule 52(a)(6) or expressly acknowledge applying a different 
standard.130 
On the other hand, Justices on both ends of the political spectrum have at 
times advocated applying Rule 52(a)(6) to certain findings of social fact, 
criticizing their colleagues for failing to defer to the district court.131 Justice 
 
126. Id. at 168. 
127. Id. at 168–69 n.3. 
128. See id. at 168–73; see also infra text accompanying notes 404–07 (criticizing the Court’s 
approach in Lockhart). 
129. See Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality 
opinion) (“The writings and studies of social science experts on legislative facts are often considered 
and cited by the Supreme Court with or without introduction into the record or even consideration by 
the trial court. E.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, [899] n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3397 n. 7, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1090 (1983) (validity of predictions of violent behavior); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, [757] n. 
9, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3355 n. 9, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (the effect upon the child used as a subject for 
pornographic materials); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n. 10, 233 n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 1034 n. 
10, 1035 n. 11, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978) (effect of the size of jury upon deliberation and verdict); Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n. 31, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930 n. 31, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n. 8, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2635 
n. 8, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (the relation between obscenity and socially deleterious behavior); Brown 
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 11, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692 n. 11, 98 L.Ed. 873 
(1954) (the effect of segregation upon minority children).”). 
130. See cases cited supra note 129. 
131. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 179 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing majority for failure to defer to district court factfinding on “partial-birth 
abortion,” and suggesting district courts’ findings merit the Court’s respect); League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 493–94, 497 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for failing to defer to a federal district court panel’s findings 
regarding vote dilution and whether alternative apportionment would achieve greater minority 
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Ginsburg’s somewhat tentative reference to Rule 52(a)(6) in her dissenting 
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart132 is one example.133 In Carhart II, the Supreme 
Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(“PBABA”).134 Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for its failure to defer to 
the findings of the three federal district courts that had held trials on the ban. 
The district courts largely agreed in their factual conclusions regarding the 
safety advantages of the intact D&E procedure (a question of social fact).135 
However, Justice Ginsburg stopped short of stating unequivocally that the 
“clearly erroneous” standard applied, providing only a “see, e.g.,” reference to 
Rule 52(a)(6) and noting that the district courts’ findings “merit this Court’s 
respect” and that “[t]oday’s opinion supplies no reason to reject those 
findings.”136 The Court’s unclear treatment of Rule 52(a)(6) and social facts, 
however, has not deterred several federal courts of appeals from applying the 
social facts exception and citing Lockhart for support, as if it sets forth a 
definitive rule.137 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which governs “judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts,”138 may indirectly contribute to the idea that Rule 52(a)(6) 
does not apply to social facts. Judicial notice allows a court to rely on case-
specific facts without proof from the parties.139 Rule 201(b) provides that “[t]he 
 
representation); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 98–99 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority, in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, for its failure to defer under Rule 52(a)(6) 
to a district court’s findings regarding the purpose of a drug-testing program, but suggesting he himself 
would have overturned “any other finding”). 
132. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 179. The Court upheld a similar Nebraska ban seven years earlier 
in Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
133. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566, 585–86 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (lambasting Court for its failure to defer, “contrary to our established practice,” to a finding 
of “‘gender-based developmental differences’ supporting Virginia’s restriction of the ‘adversative’ 
[training] method to only a men’s [military educational] institution”). 
134. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168. 
135. See id. at 178–79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
136. See id. at 179. 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994) (declining to defer 
to “the lower court’s assessment of the ‘evidence’ [offered] to demonstrate the irrational and racially 
discriminatory nature of the adoption of the distinction between cocaine base and cocaine powder 
offenses”); Menora v. Ill. High School Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982) (reversing the 
district court’s factual determination that insecurely fastened yarmulkes do not pose substantial hazard 
to basketball players and declaring that “a fact that goes to the reasonableness of a rule or other 
enactment is a classic example of a legislative fact, to which as we have said the clearly-erroneous 
standard does not apply”). Other circuit courts have been less emphatic. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 
382 F.3d 91, 135 n.24 (appearing to assume that “this Court may ultimately undertake de novo review 
of any legislative facts found by the District Court [and that] appellate courts take judicial notice of 
legislative facts under appropriate circumstances,” but stressing the helpfulness of a complete trial 
record on complex questions of social fact and that “the types of ‘legislative facts’ that have been 
addressed most recently in our caselaw deal with much more straightforward questions, e.g., 
geography and jurisdiction or the fact that cocaine is derived from coca leaves”). 
138. FED. R. EVID. 201(a). 
139. 29 AM. JUR. 2D, EVIDENCE § 24 (2013). 
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court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.”140 
Disputable case-specific facts may not be judicially noticed and must be 
introduced through the adversarial process at trial.141 
Rule 201 does not apply to social facts.142 Indeed, no Federal Rule of 
Evidence directly addresses whether disputable social facts, like disputable 
case-specific facts, must be tested at trial or can instead be judicially noticed.143 
But the advisory committee note to Rule 201 suggests that district and appellate 
courts are free to notice social facts at will, without requiring them to be 
introduced through the adversarial process at trial.144 The note asserts this 
despite submitting that social facts are by nature not indisputable.145 The notion 
that an appellate judge has almost unlimited discretion in how to treat social 
facts is incompatible with appellate deference to trial court findings of social 
fact and therefore could account for the widespread assumption that Rule 
52(a)(6) does not encompass social facts. 
The Rule 201 advisory committee note draws heavily on Kenneth Culp 
Davis’s distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts to explain why 
ordinary judicial notice requirements do not apply to social facts. According to 
Davis, “The rules of evidence for finding facts which form the basis for 
creation of law and determination of policy should differ from the rules for 
finding facts which concern only the parties to a particular case.”146 In 
particular, Davis suggests that courts should not be bound by judicial notice 
requirements when considering social facts.147 Similarly, Edmund Morgan has 
argued, 
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, 
the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may 
reject the propositions of either party or of both parties. He may 
consult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may 
refuse to do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive 
data or rest content with what he has or what the parties present. . . . 
[T]he parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the 
process.148 
 
140. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Facts that meet this definition are generally facts that are 
considered common knowledge, or that are verifiable through official records or “publications of 
established authenticity.” AM. JUR. supra note 139, § 26. 
141. AM. JUR. supra note 139, § 32. 
142. This is true of the federal rule, but state rules may allow for judicial notice of both social 
and case-specific facts. See id. §§ 24, 27. 
143. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 350 n.299 (1999). 
144. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note. 
145. Id. (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and 
Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 82 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964)). 
146. Davis, supra note 7, at 402. 
147. Davis, supra note 145, at 82. 
148. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (1944) (emphasis 
added). 
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Echoing Davis’s and Morgan’s recommendations, the advisory committee 
note counsels absolute discretion on the part of trial and appellate judges to 
obtain and use social facts in any manner they choose: 
This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative 
facts. It renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of 
indisputability, any formal requirements of notice other than those 
already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and 
exchanging briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any 
level.149 
However, allowing judges to judicially notice any relevant social fact 
without formal factfinding is inconsistent with Rule 52(a)’s requirement that a 
federal district judge issue findings on disputed facts after a trial and that an 
appellate court defer to those findings unless clearly erroneous. The advisory 
committee’s discussion of social facts in the context of Rule 201 has no doubt 
sown confusion and helped perpetuate the idea that a social facts exception to 
Rule 52(a)(6) has merit because the only way to square the Rule 201 advisory 
committee note with Rule 52(a) is to assume that Rule 52(a) likewise does not 
apply to social facts. Nevertheless, the advisory committee note does not 
establish any binding rule and thus should not compel this result. 
3. The Constitutional Fact Doctrine 
A second broad exception to Rule 52(a)(6), and the only one the Supreme 
Court has expressly acknowledged and developed, is the constitutional fact 
doctrine.150 This doctrine holds that, in order to retain authority over 
constitutional interpretation, appellate courts must review independently all 
factual determinations that are dispositive of the ultimate constitutional 
question in a case.151 Yet the Court’s articulation and application of the 
doctrine has been murky at best.152 Although its roots lie in the context of 
administrative law,153 the constitutional fact doctrine has taken root most 
 
149. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). The note adds, 
somewhat vaguely, that the recommended approach “should, however, leave open the possibility of 
introducing evidence through regular channels in appropriate situations.” Id. The note does not 
elaborate upon what those “appropriate situations” might be. 
150. The “constitutional fact” exception applies not only to Rule 52(a)(6) but also to other 
rules, statutes, or constitutional provisions that call for deference to the factfinding of a lower federal or 
state court judge or jury. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (applying the doctrine as an 
exception to a federal statute granting a presumption of correctness to state court factual 
determinations in habeas corpus proceedings); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(reviewing a state court judgment entered on a jury verdict and applying the doctrine as an exception to 
the Seventh Amendment). 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 90–97. 
152. See e.g., Adamson, supra note 17, at 3 (referring to the “constitutional fact” exception to 
Rule 52(a)(6) as a “sub rosa exception”); Christie, supra note 105, at 55 (observing that the Court’s 
conclusions as to which types of legal issues are encompassed by the constitutional fact doctrine “can 
only be described as quixotic”). 
153. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 247–48. 
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clearly and firmly in the First Amendment context.154 This contemporary 
version of the doctrine is concerned with courts’ respective spheres of authority 
within the judicial hierarchy, in particular the desire to assure appellate courts’ 
supremacy in constitutional lawmaking. In these cases, the Court has used the 
term “constitutional fact” to refer to “ultimate,” case-specific facts that are 
determinative of a First Amendment question.155 For example, in Bose 
Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., the Court held that 
appellate courts must independently review findings of fact regarding whether a 
statement was made with “actual malice.”156 Bose applied and elaborated the 
Court’s earlier admonition, reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,157 that 
appellate courts are obligated to examine the “whole record” to ensure the 
protection of free speech.158 The Bose Court determined that, if the Court is to 
retain its authority over constitutional lawmaking, the “clearly erroneous” 
standard cannot apply to facts that define the law of permissible regulation of 
speech.159 The Court in Bose did not make clear, however, whether its ruling 
was limited to First Amendment cases.160 
Beyond the First Amendment context, the Court’s application of the 
constitutional fact doctrine appears vague and ad hoc.161 Although the Supreme 
Court has not expressly extended the doctrine to other contexts, some of its 
opinions suggest the doctrine applies more widely. For example, in Miller v. 
Fenton, the Court held that the voluntariness of a confession, whether decided 
by a federal district court or a state court, must be determined independently on 
appeal.162 The Court acknowledged that, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), state-
 
154. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (“[O]ur review of petitioners’ claim that their activity is indeed in the nature of 
protected speech carries with it a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the 
record as a whole, without deference to the trial court.”); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 
(1987) (“[A]ny factual findings subsumed in the [First Amendment] ‘public concern’ determination 
are subject to constitutional fact review.”). 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 90–94.  
156. 466 U.S. 485, 487 (1984). 
157. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (citing cases). 
158. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 499 (“[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have 
repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the 
whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the 
field of free expression.’” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–86)). 
159. See id. at 499; see also FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 127 (“The duty to define the 
Constitution’s meaning effectively incorporates the duty to ensure its proper application. This can only 
be accomplished by some heightened level of review of constitutional case-specific fact-finding.”). 
160. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 243–44 (“[B]y fastening the demand for independent 
judgment to special first amendment considerations, the Court seemingly bypasse[d] the need to face 
more systemic considerations.”). 
161. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 127 (“In cases outside free speech, [whether independent 
review] applies to constitutional case-specific facts is less clear.”); Adamson, supra note 17, at 25 
(stating that “[i]ndependent determination on constitutionally significant findings of historical fact has 
been invoked under constitutional provisions other than the First Amendment” and citing examples, 
but criticizing Court for not applying the doctrine in redistricting cases). 
162. 474 U.S. 104 (1985). 
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court findings of fact [generally] ‘shall be presumed to be correct’ in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding,” and addressed whether a confession’s voluntariness 
was a question of fact entitled to this presumption. Because voluntariness 
determines the “ultimate constitutional question” of a confession’s 
admissibility, the Court held that Congress would not have considered it to be a 
factual question accorded the presumption of correctness under the statute.163 
The Court did point out, on the other hand, that “subsidiary factual questions, 
such as whether a drug has the properties of a truth serum, or whether in fact 
the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant,” were 
entitled to the presumption.164 (Interestingly, the first question is one of social 
fact, whereas the second is case specific, yet the Court did not differentiate 
between them.) 
In Miller, the Court stopped short of establishing a general rule that 
requires independent review whenever an issue of fact “is dispositive of the 
ultimate constitutional question.”165 The Court weighed the conflicting 
precedents on the question, noting that it has occasionally called for de novo 
review when a question of fact is so closely tied to a question of law that an 
appellate court must retain independent authority to decide it.166 On the other 
hand, the Court noted that deference to a trial court’s factfinding may be 
appropriate in certain instances, “notwithstanding the intimate connection 
between such determinations and . . . constitutional guarantee[s],” where the 
trial court is better positioned to evaluate the facts, such as where witness 
credibility or juror bias is at issue.167 
In certain types of constitutional rights cases, the Supreme Court has 
expressly adhered to Rule 52(a)(6) rather than applying the constitutional fact 
doctrine. For example, in cases involving equal protection challenges to 
redistricting plans, the Court applies the “clearly erroneous” standard.168 The 
Court has not given a good explanation for this exception to the exception.169 
 
163. Id. at 105, 112. 
164. Id. at 112. 
165. Id. at 113 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979)). 
166. See id. at 114 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 
(1984)). 
167. Id. at 114–15. 
168. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (“[T]he clearly-erroneous test of 
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review of a finding of 
vote dilution”); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623, 627 (1982). The Court has, however, 
sometimes declined to defer to district court rulings by deeming their findings clearly erroneous. See, 
e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 
548 U.S. 399, 493–94, 497 (2006) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing 
majority for failing to defer to the findings of a federal district court regarding vote dilution and 
whether alternative apportionment would achieve greater minority representation). Bryan Adamson 
criticizes the Court for its failure to apply the constitutional fact doctrine in redistricting cases as it does 
in First Amendment cases. See generally Adamson, supra note 17; cf. Container Corp. of Am. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 & n.13 (1983) (acknowledging a general principle of de novo 
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Supreme Court decisions that expressly invoke the term “constitutional 
fact” almost invariably refer to case-specific facts,170 but another version of the 
doctrine would specifically encompass social facts. Most scholars who have 
written about the constitutional fact doctrine have, like the Court, focused their 
attention on case-specific facts.171 However, some commentators have 
identified and discussed a broader application of the constitutional fact 
doctrine. Under this view, appellate courts should independently review all 
facts, regardless of type, that affect the resolution of cases involving 
constitutional rights.172 Social facts in particular fall outside the scope of Rule 
52(a)(6), according to this theory, because of their importance in shaping 
precedent that will affect more than just the parties before the Court.173 To the 
extent this argument hinges on the importance of social facts in the creation and 
development of constitutional law, this expanded version of the theory 
essentially collapses into the social facts exception. 
Two related but distinct rationales underpin the constitutional fact 
doctrine. Because “constitutional fact” determinations are seen as so closely 
tied to conclusions of law regarding constitutional interpretation, de novo 
review is justified on the basis that appellate courts cannot defer on the factual 
questions without relinquishing independent judgment over the ultimate legal 
questions.174 Part of the concern is about appellate courts retaining authority 
over lawmaking—the issue that all mixed questions of fact and law raise. But 
there is a more profound principle at work as well, one that recognizes the 
judiciary’s important role as a protector of rights. According to the Supreme 
Court, the constitutional fact doctrine “reflects a deeply held conviction that 
 
appellate review of constitutional facts but declining to apply it to state court factfinding in cases 
involving application of the “unitary business principle” of corporate franchise taxation). 
169. See generally Adamson, supra note 17 (criticizing Court for its inconsistency). 
170. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (whether defendant was “in 
custody” for purposes of determining if Miranda warnings were required); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987) (whether a statement supporting a presidential assassination attempt was 
political hyperbole or sincere); Miller, 474 U.S. 104 (whether a confession was voluntary); Bose, 466 
U.S. 485 (whether a statement was made with actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 163–
64 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) (whether a work is obscene); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 
(1972) (whether a poem is obscene); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (whether a 
statement was made with actual malice); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (whether a statement was made with actual malice); Nw. Airlines 
v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 299 (1944) (what percentage of a company’s property was used outside of 
the state during the tax year); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 403–06 
(1940) (whether a particular river is navigable); see also Monaghan, supra note 4, at 230 & n.16 
(describing the constitutional fact doctrine as relevant to judicial review of adjudicative facts, not 
legislative facts).  
171. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 17; Christie, supra note 105; Monaghan, supra note 4. 
172. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 128–29 (“As a practical matter, . . . all fact-finding done 
within categories of covered rights is subject to independent review. There is no separate class of facts, 
therefore, . . . that merit deferential review.”). 
173. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 10. 
174. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 n.27. 
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judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exercise [independent] 
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by 
the Constitution.”175 
II. 
RETHINKING THE EXCLUSION OF SOCIAL FACTS FROM RULE 52(A)(6) 
Because the Court has applied Rule 52(a)(6) so haphazardly, it is helpful 
to consider whether the institutional values undergirding the standard are 
promoted or undermined by a social facts exception in constitutional rights 
cases.176 A review of the rationales for Rule 52(a)(6), as well as for the social 
facts exception and the constitutional fact doctrine, casts doubt upon the 
appropriateness of de novo appellate review of social facts in constitutional 
rights cases.177 The justifications supporting the “clearly erroneous” standard 
include pragmatic and substantive reasons. The pragmatic reasons are to 
promote efficiency and stability. The substantive reason is that trial courts are 
more competent to find facts than appellate courts, and thus the factfinding will 
be of a higher quality. Likewise, the rationales for social and constitutional fact 
exceptions to Rule 52(a)(6) encompass both pragmatic and substantive 
concerns. The pragmatic justifications include that social facts have always 
been treated as exceptional, that a change would be unworkable, and that 
different trial judges may reach conflicting conclusions about the same facts. 
The substantive concerns include that trial court factfinding may be 
substandard due to disparities in lawyer competence, party resources, or other 
factors; that social facts are by nature indeterminate; that they have precedential 
impact that goes beyond the parties to the case; that appellate courts must retain 
authority over lawmaking; and that the appellate courts, and ultimately the 
Supreme Court, have a responsibility to protect constitutional rights. 
Before examining these justifications, it bears remembering that Rule 
52(a)(6) itself does not classify facts in any way. Unlike Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201, it is not expressly limited to “adjudicative facts.” Indeed, when 
courts at one time read Rule 52(a)(6) too restrictively by limiting its scope to 
testimonial evidence, the rule was amended to preclude this.178 It remains to be 
considered whether, despite the rule’s broad wording, the rationales described 
above justify a court-made exception for such facts. The following sections 
argue that they do not. 
 
175. Id. at 510–11; see also Alfange, supra note 7, at 638; David L. Faigman, et al., Amicus 
Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. in the Case 
of Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 91–92 (2006). 
176. Adamson, supra note 17, at 29 (making the same point with respect to case-specific 
constitutional facts in redistricting cases). 
177. Many, but not all, of the arguments made here may cast doubt upon the validity of the 
two exceptions more generally. Whether and to what extent this is the case merits further review. 
178. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
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A. Efficiency and Stability 
The first goal of Rule 52(a)(6), efficiency, is equally applicable to social 
facts and case-specific facts. Few have suggested that we simply dispense with 
bench trials on contested issues of social fact in constitutional rights cases.179 
But why have trials at all if appellate courts can simply start from scratch?180 
Under such an approach, the trial is nothing more than a trial run. Of course, de 
novo review does not preclude the appellate court from considering, and even 
accepting, the trial court’s findings. But such review provides no guarantee of 
deference whatsoever. The trial court findings are rendered advisory, at best, 
giving the losing party incentive to push for duplicative appellate examination 
of the facts.181 
Moreover, rendering trials an “essentially pointless exercise”182 in this 
manner undermines trial courts’ legitimacy. It threatens to erode the public’s 
and parties’ confidence in the conclusions of district courts, which often have 
the final word in litigation.183 Far from encouraging district judges to do a 
thorough and impartial job of evaluating contentious questions of social fact,184 
it dismisses their work as superfluous. And it creates uncertainty for parties, 
since there is no clear standard for the evaluation of social facts on appeal if the 
“clearly erroneous” standard does not apply. Parties are always subject to 
having facts introduced on appeal by amici or the court itself, without an 
opportunity to respond.185 
Therefore, just as with case-specific facts, applying Rule 52(a)(6) to social 
facts would help conserve judicial resources and ensure stability by making 
trials a meaningful part of the litigation process. 
 
179. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 45, 49, 64 (arguing against appellate deference to 
trial court findings of social fact but accepting that judicial examination of contested social facts 
generally begins with a trial). But see Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 495 (suggesting briefing 
and independent judicial research in place of trials). 
180. Indeed, at least one commentator suggests that appellate courts must conduct such “a 
wholesale reassessment” of the factual record in constitutional rights cases. See Adamson, supra note 
17, at 24–25.  
181. See Wright, supra note 106, at 780. 
182. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 163 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “‘the 
careful efforts of state and lower federal courts to apply the [patently offensive] standard will remain 
an essentially pointless exercise’” given the majority’s affirmance of independent Supreme Court 
review of this question) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
183. Cf. Wright, supra note 106, at 779. Wright notes that the undisputed function of appellate 
courts “is to discover and declare—or to make—the law . . . to reverse for errors of law, to announce 
the rules which are to be applied, and to ensure uniformity in the rules applied by various inferior 
tribunals.” Id. He questions, however, whether appellate courts should serve a “second function” of 
policing the trial court’s applications of law in particular cases. Wright believes there is a high price to 
pay for an expanded view of appellate power, because the ability to obtain appellate review will be 
limited to wealthier parties, and because public confidence in trial courts, which will continue to 
decide most cases, will be undermined. Id. 
184. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163. 
185. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 31–32. 
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B. Institutional Competence 
Rule 52(a)(6) not only promotes efficiency but also recognizes the trial 
courts’ superior factfinding capacity.186 This rationale too applies equally to 
case-specific and social facts. As discussed above, the 1985 amendment to Rule 
52(a)(6) clarified that the rule applies to “documentary and other evidence,” not 
just to testimonial evidence, where most would agree that the trial judge’s 
ability to assess witness credibility gives her a distinct factfinding advantage 
over the appellate courts. Social facts may be presented to the trial court 
through expert testimony, documentary evidence, or both. The rule’s broad 
language encompasses social facts, so the presumption should be that the rule 
applies to them. Two related arguments for their exclusion, however, are that 
social facts should be treated differently because they are ill-suited for trial, or 
because appellate courts are equally competent to find such facts. Neither of 
these reasons justifies excising social facts from the rule. 
Some scholars have argued that trials are an undesirable way for judges to 
take in social facts. John Monahan and Laurens Walker, for example, argue that 
courts at all levels should be free to independently research social facts and that 
parties should present social science evidence exclusively through written 
briefs, which they suggest “are a superior medium to verbal testimony for 
communicating technical social science information.”187 Monahan and Walker 
offer several reasons for doubting the suitability of a trial for presenting social 
facts. They assert that an expert witness’s ability to frame a precise answer 
suffers under the time pressure and format of delivering trial testimony. They 
contend that the oral presentation of social science evidence is longer, less 
organized, and harder to follow than a written brief. And, while they admit that 
their approach forecloses the opportunity to assess a witness’s demeanor, they 
believe that demeanor in the context of social facts is more distracting than 
helpful to the court.188 
Monahan and Walker’s account overlooks many of the advantages of the 
trial format, however. One factfinding benefit that trial judges enjoy is the 
opportunity to “experience with their own senses the physical evidence that has 
been introduced and [to] observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the other 
participants in the trial.”189 Contrary to Monahan and Walker’s suggestion, this 
advantage serves judges well in receiving evidence on social facts. Indeed, it 
 
186. See Benjamin, supra note 143, at 333 (“Appellate courts . . . are removed from the world 
of fact-finding and have no expertise in it.”). This is not to say that the American adversarial process is 
ideally suited to discovering the truth, whether of case-specific or social facts. See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, 
KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 273–314 (1999) (arguing that many aspects of the American 
adversarial system of adjudication inhibit the search for truth). The question this Article addresses is 
whether, given the system we have, independent appellate review is more likely to lead to accurate 
social factfinding. 
187. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 496. 
188. Id. at 496–97. 
189. Christie, supra note 105, at 46 (addressing exclusively “historical” or case-specific facts). 
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can be particularly helpful when a trial court confronts the contentious factual 
issues often underlying laws that restrict controversial or minority rights. For 
example, because legislators often demonize proponents of a particular point of 
view when addressing hot button social issues, it is critical for a judge to hear 
testimony at trial to test such characterizations. During a legislative hearing on 
Alaska’s “partial-birth abortion” ban, advocates and members of the public 
compared abortion procedures to the “Nazi Holocaust” and testified that the 
medical profession had “cut its own throat” by allowing abortion providers to 
“perform unjustified abortions” and to “falsify the patient’s records” in order to 
secure a “pre-arranged convenience for the mother and a financial benefit for 
the doctor.”190 Congressional testimony on the federal PBABA was likewise 
“not only unbalanced, but intentionally polemic.”191 The trial judges’ 
opportunity to see and hear abortion doctors in person helped to counter these 
caricatures192 and may help to explain why twelve out of thirteen federal 
district courts invalidated state bans, and why all three district courts to 
consider the PBABA held it unconstitutional. 
Live testimony can provide other distinct advantages over paper evidence 
to judges learning about an unfamiliar topic. For example, in the “partial-birth 
abortion” cases, judges could ask questions of the experts, who could then draw 
diagrams and display abortion instruments and plastic models of female 
anatomy.193 To claim that briefs are superior to oral testimony is akin to saying 
that law students would learn better if they simply read the material rather than 
attending class. The claim ignores the extent to which trials addressing social 
facts are an educational process. It also falsely presents the parties’ options as 
binary and mutually exclusive. Monahan and Walker wish to resolve what they 
see as undesirable flexibility (or “indecision”) in the choice of whether to 
present empirical research via briefs or oral testimony by forcing litigants into a 
single choice (briefing).194 Their perspective discounts the benefits to parties in 
being able to choose the most effective presentations for the types of evidence 
relevant to their cases. 
Moreover, the suggestion that social facts are ill-suited for trial wrongly 
assumes a bright-line distinction between social and case-specific facts. Often, 
social facts are no different from case-specific facts in terms of the competence 
required to assess them. For example, there is no real difference between expert 
 
190. Borgmann, supra note 19, at 23–24 (quoting official Alaska legislative summary). 
191. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. 
Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
192. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 24. 
193. See id. at 24–27. 
194. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 496 (“The parties appear to be free either to 
present legislative facts via expert witnesses at a hearing or to include them in briefs, as Brandeis did in 
Muller. Conceiving of scientific research not as legislative fact but as social authority resolves this 
indecision.”). 
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testimony that addresses whether a particular tire blew out because of a defect 
in the tire (a case-specific fact), and expert testimony addressing whether a 
specific brand of tires is defective in a manner likely to cause blowouts (a 
social fact).195 Why is one appropriate for trial and the other not? 
Running social facts through the rigors of the trial process also serves a 
helpful screening function that is wholly absent when judges rely on factual 
assertions pulled only from the parties’ or amici’s briefs, or from their own 
research.196 For example, Arthur Miller and Jerome Barron discuss the plethora 
of historical and other information about abortion that the plaintiffs and amici 
supplied the Court in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 
without any opportunity for vetting at trial or for opposing counsel to respond 
effectively.197 In contrast, as David Faigman points out, “When evidence of 
reviewable [i.e. social] facts is offered at trial, ordinarily it is through the 
testimony of experts and must meet threshold requirements of admissibility. In 
most state and federal courts, rules of admissibility are designed to ensure that 
the basic foundation for this proffered testimony is valid.”198 
Kenneth Culp Davis argues that courts cannot practically apply these rules 
of admissibility to social facts.199 Monahan and Walker agree with Davis that 
applying the usual admissibility rules to social facts would “produce ‘obviously 
intolerable’ results” because a judge may know about, and have to ignore, key 
research that the parties failed to introduce.200 The judge would then be forced 
“knowingly to create an inadequate and perhaps erroneous rule of law that 
could affect future cases.”201 
This concern seems vastly overdrawn. At the trial level, the judge could 
simply point out the study to the parties and ask them to address it. At the 
appellate level, the court could request supplemental briefing or, if necessary, 
remand the case to the trial court for further factual development. Moreover, 
just because a judge is “aware” of a study that the parties failed to address does 
not mean she should be permitted to insert an independently researched fact 
that “could affect a ruling of law in a case.”202 While it is possible that the 
judge knows more than the parties about the particular issue and has researched 
it well, it is equally possible that the parties rejected the research for legitimate 
reasons, or that subjecting the research to the trial’s normal gate-keeping 
 
195. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). 
196. Gorod, supra note 19. 
197. Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1202 (“The data were submitted with the request that 
judicial notice be taken of them. That means ‘retrial’ at the Supreme Court level, without benefit of 
adversarial presentations.”). 
198. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 170–71. 
199. Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941 (1980). 
200. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 486 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of 
Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 68, 83 (1964)). 
201. Id. at 486 n.31. 
202. Id.  
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processes would prove the research to be of questionable reliability or 
relevance. 
It is true that it is not always necessary or even appropriate to apply all 
admissibility rules, such as rules concerning hearsay, to expert testimony 
addressing social facts. Nevertheless, trial judges (probably out of habit) do 
tend to apply many of the rules of evidence, especially concerning the 
admissibility of expert testimony, to social facts submitted at trial.203 Whether 
this is required or not, it is usually a beneficial practice in that it serves to weed 
out scientifically suspect testimony.204 
Some commentators argue that social facts must be exempt from Rule 
52(a)(6) because the parties to litigation may not present all the relevant social 
fact evidence due to a lack of resources, the inexperience of counsel, or the 
parties’ narrow focus on their case-specific circumstances.205 When it comes to 
issuing findings on social fact that will affect many, such as when a court 
considers whether a law should be deemed unconstitutional, these 
commentators argue, the record is properly supplemented by the courts’ own 
research and factual submissions via amicus brief.206 
It is not at all clear, though, that the benefits of appellate-level fact 
development outweigh its downsides. This is especially true given the lack of 
procedural guidelines governing appellate treatment of social facts.207 Perhaps 
the most significant concern is that of due process. Parties often lack a 
meaningful opportunity to respond to, and rebut where appropriate, evidence 
introduced by amici or the court. This raises serious notice and fairness 
concerns.208 Reply briefs, constrained by page limits, often do not allow 
appellants to comprehensively rebut new factual assertions.209 And appellees 
may not get the opportunity to file a reply brief at all.210 Likewise, oral 
 
203. Borgmann, supra note 19, at 43; Davis, supra note 199, at 941. 
204. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 100–01 (suggesting that courts should apply Daubert-
like standards to the evaluation of social science evidence). This Article does not address whether the 
abuse-of-discretion standard, which is normally applied to trial judges’ decisions regarding the 
admissibility of evidence, is appropriately applied to social facts. Given the lack of clarity concerning 
which rules of evidence apply to social facts, this issue deserves further attention. 
205. See infra Part III.B.2. 
206. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 100 (“An attorney’s failure to adequately develop the 
factual record in an ordinary dispute only affects his or her client’s matter . . . [but] in constitutional 
litigation [it] potentially affects a multitude of cases . . . . If amici were not readily available to supply 
evidence regarding reviewable facts, the Court would be obligated to conduct its own independent 
research or remand for further factual development.”). 
207. Gorod, supra note 19, at 43–46. 
208. Id. at 4–5, 7–9; see also Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1202 (amicus briefs submitted 
by abortion-rights groups in Roe were replete with data “submitted with the request that judicial notice 
be taken of them,” meaning “retrial at the Supreme Court level without the benefit of adversarial 
presentations”). But see Larsen, supra note 32, at 1271 n.74 (“[C]ounting amicus submissions of fact 
as within the adversarial process because the litigants may respond to them before a decision is 
rendered (through reply briefs or at oral argument).”). 
209. Gorod, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
210. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(c). 
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arguments, with their strict time limits, are inadequate forums for rebutting 
factual claims.211 Finally, if the court conducts its own research and mentions 
its findings for the first time in its opinion, the parties are denied even these 
limited opportunities to respond.212 And this unfairness extends beyond the 
parties to the public: 
If the rights and duties of uncounted Americans are being affected or 
influenced, if not controlled, by Supreme Court decisions often based 
on independent research conducted sua sponte by the Justices, then the 
products of those researches, to the extent that they are significant in 
the final decisions, are not tested by contrary argument. Those who 
lose, whether they are the particular litigants before the bar of the 
Court or those in the general public whose values run counter to the 
decisions, are not accorded their “day in court” that is basic to 
fairness.213 
The realities of appellate-level factfinding raise another serious concern, 
which is the integrity of the evidence introduced on appeal. Without the 
procedural safeguards employed at the trial level, scientific and other evidence 
of questionable validity can easily find its way into the case.214 Amicus briefs, 
in particular, are often submitted by advocates and may be replete with dubious 
factual assertions that would never be admitted at trial. When this happens, the 
concern that social factfinding will have a precedential impact cuts against 
appellate level factfinding, because lower courts are likely to treat the 
questionable, unvetted factual conclusions as influential, if not binding. 
This problem is vividly illustrated by Justice Kennedy’s declaration in 
Gonzales v. Carhart asserting, admittedly without “reliable data,” that women 
are emotionally traumatized by abortion.215 The “authority” Justice Kennedy 
cites for this assertion is an amicus brief submitted by Sandra Cano, the 
plaintiff from Doe v. Bolton,216 who now claims to regret her abortion, and 
“180 post-abortive women who have suffered the adverse emotional and 
 
211. Gorod, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
212. Id. 
213. Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1226. 
214. See id. at 1226, 1228 (expressing concern when factual assertions made by Supreme 
Court are “not tested by contrary argument” and noting that “[t]he lack of a sound factual base in 
promulgating general norms raises the question of legitimacy”). Kenneth Culp Davis recognizes that 
allowing appellate courts free rein to find their own social facts will permit them to make controversial 
findings and to rely upon potentially unreliable sources: “When Mr. Justice Brandeis . . . said in the 
O’Fallon case that the railroads’ ‘property investment account in 1920 was about 19 billions of 
dollars,’ the fact stated was hardly ‘notorious,’ and the source was a statement by Senator Cummins in 
the Congressional Record, surely not a source of ‘indisputable accuracy.’” Davis, supra note 7, at 405 
(quoting St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 497 (1929) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). Brandeis’s opinion in this case was a dissent, but Davis nevertheless seems untroubled by 
the thought of such facts forming the basis of constitutional rulings. See id. at 405–06. 
215. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
216. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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psychological effects of abortion.”217 The brief was part of a deliberate 
campaign on the part of anti-abortion-rights groups to persuade Justice 
Kennedy to reverse his position on the constitutional status of abortion.218 The 
asserted “fact” was of no real relevance to the case,219 was not introduced by 
the parties, was of questionable scientific validity,220 surely would not have 
survived the rigors of a trial,221 and was even conceded by the Justice uttering it 
to lack a sufficient scientific foundation.222 Yet it now carries the imprimatur of 
the Supreme Court and is being cited by lawyers trying to convince courts to 
uphold laws requiring women be told that abortions cause women emotional 
harm. And courts are buying the argument. The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, sitting en banc, recently cited Justice Kennedy’s statement in support 
of its decision upholding a South Dakota law that requires abortion providers to 
tell their patients that women who have abortions face an “[i]ncreased risk of 
suicide ideation and suicide.”223 In news coverage of the case, a spokeswoman 
 
217. Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Carhart II, 550 
U.S. 124 (No. 05-380); see also Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159. 
218. Letter from Samuel B. Casey & Harold J. Cassidy (Law Life Project, Christian Legal 
Society) to Members of the South Dakota Pro-Life Leadership Coalition, at 10 (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file 
with the author). As part of a broad legislative strategy, the South Dakota legislature appointed a task 
force to document alleged abortion-related emotional trauma. REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK 
FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005), available at http://www.lc.org/attachments/SD_abortion_rpt.pdf; 
see also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective 
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1011 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: 
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1641, 1644–51 (2008). The work of the task force was so biased that the anti-abortion chair voted 
against its report to publicize her objections. Siegel, supra, at 1681. 
219. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 45. 
220. Indeed, the weight of scientific evidence, as Justice Kennedy recognized, disproves the 
brief’s assertions that abortion causes lasting mental trauma. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 15; see also id. at 
183–84 & n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing plethora of evidence discrediting claim that “having an 
abortion is any more dangerous to a woman’s long-term mental health than delivering and parenting a 
child that she did not intend to have”). 
221. The brief did not purport to be a scientific study, but rather consisted of anecdotal 
evidence (the attestation of “180 post-abortive women”) not subjected to cross-examination or the 
Rules of Evidence. See Brief of Sandra Cano, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, 
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380); cf. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
(setting forth standards for admissibility of scientific evidence). 
222. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159. 
223. Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (quoting statute) (internal quotation marks omitted). The en banc court decided the case in a 
way that minimized the relevance of any causal link between abortion and suicide. See id. at 905 
(requiring only that physician disclose a correlation between abortion and suicide rather than “that a 
causal link between abortion and suicide has been proved”). But the court nevertheless strongly 
suggested the existence of such a link, relying in part on Carhart II. See id. at 899 (citing Carhart II as 
support for claim that depression and psychological distress are known risks of abortion and 
concluding that, “[a]s a matter of common sense, the onset of depression and psychological distress 
also would increase one’s risk of suicide and suicide ideation”). 
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for Americans United for Life jubilantly explained how the group’s strategy of 
advancing this claim via amicus briefs had paid off.224 
If appellate courts routinely received inadequately developed factual 
records from the trial courts, perhaps we would be forced to accept the risks of 
judicial reliance on extra-record evidence. But this concern should be taken 
with a grain of salt.225 Lawsuits challenging laws or policies as unconstitutional 
are often brought by well-funded advocacy groups. When these lawsuits 
involve controversial, high-profile social issues, the government is also likely 
to receive substantial support from advocacy groups. In fact, when 
governmental officials refuse to defend laws in such cases, national advocacy 
groups or their regular lawyers can be counted on to step in and take over the 
defense.226 Thus, these cases are typically litigated from the very beginning 
with the lawyers’ full awareness that they reach beyond the immediate parties 
to the case.227 It is highly likely that the facts truly necessary to resolving the 
case will have been presented at trial.228 If they are not, and if the parties 
themselves do not argue this to the appeals court, amici should be free to point 
out the factual gaps. However, if the appeals court is convinced that certain 
facts are important to the case and were not developed at trial, a remand should 
be ordered whenever possible.229 
 
224. Sarah Kliff, GOP Platform: Abortion Is Bad for Women’s ‘Health and Well-Being,’ 
WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/23/gop-
platform-abortion-is-bad-for-womens-health-and-well-being (“AUL Action President Chairmaine 
Yoest says this is something her group has been working toward for a while. They have filed 
numerous amicus briefs that outline research on the relationship between abortion and women’s 
health. ‘We’re just very excited because we feel like this is something that we’ve been working for a 
long time to establish data on,’ Yoest says. ‘We filed several amicus briefs that were all working to 
establish this idea in the public record.’” (emphasis added)). 
225. See Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 118 (“[W]hen lawyers perceive that a particular 
showing will affect the outcome in a case, they tend to make such a showing, which courts tend to 
receive. If the court relies on an imbalanced presentation in one case, attorneys with sufficient 
resources and sophistication are likely to respond in later cases with counter-presentations.”). 
226. For example, in the California Proposition 8 litigation, ProtectMarriage (a coalition of 
national groups including the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family) and the California 
Family Alliance took over the defense of the same-sex marriage ban when state officials refused. Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). Similarly, when state officials declined to defend New Jersey’s “partial-birth abortion” ban, the 
legislature turned to Richard F. Collier, Jr., president of the Legal Center for Defense of Life, Inc., to 
defend the law. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Abby Goodnough, Somerset Lawyer Is Chosen to Defend New Jersey’s Late-Term Abortion Law, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/25/nyregion/somerset-lawyer-is-
chosen-to-defend-new-jersey-s-late-term-abortion-law.html. 
227. See Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1193, 1201–02 (criticizing plaintiffs for litigating, 
and Court for deciding, Roe v. Wade in this manner). 
228. And where this does not happen, the courts could always remand for further factual 
development, or even invite amici to participate at the trial level. Gorod, supra note 19, at 76. 
229. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) (“When an appellate court discerns 
that a district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule 
is that there should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing 
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Much appellate extra-record factfinding and reliance on amici’s factual 
assertions occurs not because there is inadequate evidence in the trial record, 
but because the Justice or appellate judge authoring the opinion either does not 
like the facts found and wants to assert a contrasting factual conclusion, or is 
using the additional research as a rhetorical device. Each of these phenomena is 
well illustrated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart. As noted 
above, the point about abortion regret was tangential to the case and seems 
clearly rhetorical.230 For the facts concerning the relative safety of abortion 
procedures, which were central to the case, Justice Kennedy looked to 
Congress (although he admitted that some of its written “findings” were clearly 
wrong), rather than relying on the essentially uniform findings of the trial 
courts.231 
Sometimes appellate judges add their own facts in order to supply what 
they feel is helpful background. Judge Richard Posner calls these “coloring-
book facts,”232 and he supports judges’ and clerks’ conducting Internet research 
and other independent research to flesh out opinions with these facts when the 
lawyers have not provided them.233 Posner gives as an example “the basic facts 
about a corporate defendant, such as what its business is.”234 Posner does, 
however, make clear that “an appellate court should [not] make its decision 
turn on a fact, unless it is uncontestable, that is not in the judicial record.”235 I 
would add that appellate courts should generally refrain entirely from including 
controversial or contestable facts even if the decision does not “turn” on them. 
Because litigants and lower courts are likely to treat such factual statements as 
precedential,236 courts should only insert them if (1) the opinion would be 
difficult to follow without the background and (2) the court is explicit that the 
facts are provided by the judge, as background only. The danger of future 
reliance on such facts as precedent means that courts should resist the 
 
findings.”); Gorod, supra note 19, at 76 (urging remands when trial courts face an inadequate trial 
court record); infra text accompanying notes 379, 387–91. 
230. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text; see also Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 1007 
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing emotionally charged congressional testimony of a nurse who 
was not called to testify at any of the dozen or so trials on “partial-birth abortion” and declaring that 
“[t]he question whether States have a legitimate interest in banning the procedure does not require 
additional authority”). 
231. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007); id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
majority for rejecting three district courts’ findings and essentially favoring more dubious findings of 
Congress); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 60–61 (explaining how the Court manufactured 
“medical disagreement” by crediting congressional findings equally with district courts’ factfinding). 
232. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts—One 
Judge’s Views, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 3, 12 (2013). 
233. Id. at 11. 
234. Id.  
235. Id. 
236. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 3–4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226395 
(addressing the problem of “the tendency of lower courts to over-interpret Supreme Court opinions 
and to apply generalized statements of fact from an old case to a new one” and citing examples). 
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temptation to include them simply to make an opinion more interesting or 
stylistically elegant. 
Upon closer examination, there is no reason to think that trial courts are 
ill-equipped to receive and evaluate contested social facts. And there is good 
reason to be concerned about the current way in which appellate courts 
establish social facts. As one appellate judge has noted, “Though trial judges 
may at times be mistaken as to facts, appellate judges are not always 
omniscient.”237 It remains to be considered whether any of the other 
justifications for exempting constitutional social facts from Rule 52(a)(6) hold 
up under scrutiny. 
C. The Judiciary As Rights Protector 
One important rationale for the constitutional fact doctrine is its 
recognition of the courts’ critical role in protecting constitutional rights.238 This 
rationale has also been invoked with respect to social facts in constitutional 
rights cases. Yet the rights-protective justification fails to explain why each 
level of the federal judiciary must review social facts de novo. As Henry 
Monaghan points out, since the constitutional fact doctrine developed to 
address a “legitimacy deficit” raised by administrative adjudication, “it does 
not establish the propriety of a similar scope of review by an appellate court 
over the decisions of an inferior court.”239 Indeed, arguments supporting the 
constitutional fact doctrine fall into two distinct categories: concern for the 
judiciary as rights protector (as compared with administrative or legislative 
bodies) and concern for higher courts’ authority over lower courts in the 
creation and development of law. The first of these is not as clearly relevant to 
appellate review of trial court (as opposed to administrative agency) 
factfinding, but courts and commentators do not always make this distinction 
clear.240 
It might be argued that appellate courts must retain authority over trial 
courts’ determinations of both factual and legal questions in order to ensure that 
constitutional rights are protected.241 Since social facts are often inextricably 
entwined with law determination, an appellate court that grants deference to 
 
237. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1950). 
238. See supra text accompanying note 175. 
239. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 239. 
240. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (“[O]n rare occasions in years past 
the Court has justified independent federal or appellate review as a means of compensating for 
‘perceived shortcomings of the trier of fact.’” (emphasis added)); Brief of Constitutional Law 
Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 70–71, 91–92, Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382) (referring alternately to 
need for judicial review of legislature’s factfinding and to Supreme Court review of factfinding by any 
inferior body, including trial courts, in constitutional rights cases).  
241. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 91, Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-1382). 
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such factfinding may cede too much control to the trial court, control that may 
be used in a rights-unfriendly way.242 But this argument overlooks two things. 
First, there are a great many social facts that are important to the outcome of a 
case but that do not in and of themselves determine the meaning of a law or 
legal standard. For example, in deciding whether an abortion regulation 
amounts to an “undue burden,” a trial court may find that an abortion regulation 
was responsible for a certain percentage of clinics closing in the state. Or it 
might find that a mandatory waiting period will delay the abortions of some 
women in certain areas of the state from the first to the second trimester.243 The 
appellate court can defer to these premise facts and still independently assess 
whether the burdens are “undue” and, therefore, unconstitutional.244 
Second, an important purpose for judicial review of legislative factfinding 
is to provide an impartial forum that cannot be assured through the majoritarian 
process.245 Assuming this review is properly done at the trial court level, its 
purpose is not further served—and indeed may be undermined—if courts of 
appeals and the Supreme Court may simply ignore the facts found by the trial 
court, especially when the trial court’s factfinding favors the constitutional 
rights claimant.246 
D. Appellate Court Authority over Lawmaking 
If the judiciary’s role as rights protector does not adequately explain why 
appellate courts should not defer to trial courts’ social factfinding, there is still 
the concern that deference would undermine their lawmaking authority. It is 
often assumed that appellate review of social facts must be de novo in order to 
preserve appellate courts’ undisputed role in the development of the law and 
the interpretation of the Constitution.247 
There are three related claims made for why social factfinding implicates 
the appellate courts’ superior authority for law declaration. The first is that 
social facts are often used in the development of law; the second is that social 
facts’ general nature make them more like law than like fact; and the third is 
that social facts may present as mixed questions of law and fact. 
 
242. Id. at 91–92. 
243. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 712–
13 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (describing district court’s detailed factfinding documenting 
burdens of mandatory delay and criticizing majority for not deferring to these findings). 
244. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (establishing “undue 
burden” standard for abortion regulation). 
245. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1012 (1999) (asserting that “the most important contribution of the 
judiciary to contemporary problems” that is lacking in factfinding by legislatures is “critical inquiry”). 
246. See infra Part III.B.2. 
247. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 4, at 264. 
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1. Social Facts in the Development of Law 
Some commentators argue that social facts must be treated differently 
from case-specific facts because they are used differently, namely, in the 
service of legal reasoning or lawmaking.248 The idea is that case-specific facts 
will be used only to resolve the case directly before the court and there is 
therefore no danger that appellate deference to the trial court’s factfinding will 
establish a precedent.249 This argument rests on a false dichotomy between 
social facts and case-specific facts, however. Case-specific facts, especially 
ultimate facts,250 can also affect legal doctrine by providing a factual example 
of how a legal rule works in practice. Such a factual finding thus may take on 
the character of precedent, even though it is presented in a case-specific way.251 
Indeed, it is this concern—“the need to give doctrinal coherence to 
constitutional legal norms”252—that has given rise to the constitutional fact 
doctrine, which has been applied mainly to case-specific facts.253 Therefore, 
anyone who supports a social facts exception on grounds of appellate authority 
over lawmaking should support the constitutional fact doctrine (as applied to 
case-specific facts) for the same reason. 
However, while both social and case-specific facts may affect the 
development of constitutional doctrine, that alone cannot explain why appellate 
courts must review trial courts’ factfinding de novo. If the concern is solely that 
appellate courts must retain their lawmaking authority, this can be addressed 
without completely sacrificing Rule 52(a)(6) deference. Reviewing courts can 
maintain authority over the ultimate legal question while deferring to the 
“subsidiary findings” related to it,254 since the subsidiary factual questions can 
often be separated from the ultimate question the appellate court wishes to 
reserve for itself. For example, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power 
Co., the Supreme Court addressed whether a river was navigable.255 The Court 
pointed out the difference between the underlying facts upon which 
navigability (the legally determinative question) was to be based and the 
question of navigability itself: 
There is no real disagreement between the parties here concerning 
these physical and historical evidentiary facts. But there are sharp 
divergencies of view as to their reliability as indicia of navigability 
 
248. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 148, at 270–71. 
249. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 100. 
250. See supra notes 90–97. 
251. In Bose, the Supreme Court explained that case-specific factfinding must be 
independently reviewed on appeal where its “impact on future cases and future conduct [is] too great 
to entrust . . . finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984). 
252. Adamson, supra note 17, at 19. 
253. See supra Part I.B.3. 
254. Anderson v. Bessmer City, 470 U.S. 564, 568 (1985). 
255. 311 U.S. 377, 403–06 (1940). 
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and the weight which should be attributed to them. The disagreement 
is over the ultimate conclusion upon navigability to be drawn from this 
uncontroverted evidence.256 
The Court reserved that ultimate question for its own independent review. One 
can readily imagine that, had the underlying facts been disputed, the trial court 
could have resolved them, and the Court deferred to them, under Rule 52(a)(6). 
Social facts’ influence in shaping law may raise concerns related to the 
institutional competence question discussed above. One scholar has suggested 
that the broad effects of social factfinding mean that appellate courts must 
conduct independent review because mistakes in this context are 
unacceptable.257 This argument is only valid if trial court factfinding is 
inherently untrustworthy. If that is the case, however, then it would not be right 
to subject anyone to it and we should rethink the whole system.258 Of course, 
most do not question the integrity of trial court factfinding. In fact, as discussed 
above, Rule 52(a)(6) contemplates that trial courts are superior factfinders, and 
there is no reason to doubt this even in the case of social facts.259 
It is true that appellate deference to trial courts’ social factfinding could 
raise difficulties for appellate courts when two or more trial courts issue 
conflicting factual findings on the same question.260 If appellate courts must 
defer to the trial court’s factfinding, what is true in one jurisdiction may be 
false in another (or there could even be a conflict within a single circuit).261 Of 
course, appellate courts in different jurisdictions can and do adopt different 
interpretations of constitutional law on questions the Supreme Court has not 
already definitively decided. There is no reason to think that they will diverge 
less on issues of social fact, whether they exercise de novo review or not. In 
fact, if independent review is permitted, the lack of procedural restraints leaves 
more room for bias and other troubling factors to influence the appellate courts’ 
conclusions.262 In any event, there are ways to address the problem of 
conflicting lower court findings without completely abandoning the “clearly 
erroneous” standard.263 On the flip side, multiple lower court findings can 
actually be helpful to an appellate court when the findings are consistent, by 
reinforcing the validity of the trial court’s conclusions below. Yet, remarkably, 
 
256. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
257. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 100. 
258. See Wright, supra note 106, at 780–81. 
259. See supra text accompanying notes 118–20. 
260. See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
261. See id. 
262. See generally Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An 
Empirical Study, at 1 (Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 2011/12, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805999 (arguing that “empirical 
evidence suggests that the appellate courts routinely revisit factual determinations by the trial courts, 
although often not transparently, and that appellate courts do so on an ideological basis”). 
263. See infra Part III.C (proposing how appellate courts can handle such circumstances). 
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the Supreme Court and appellate courts have sometimes refused to defer even 
when this is the case.264 
2. The Generalized Nature of Social Facts 
Some have argued that the generalized nature of social facts makes them 
more like law than like facts and thus they should fall within the appellate 
courts’ lawmaking authority. Monahan and Walker have argued this point. 
They suggest that social facts could plausibly be grouped either with law or 
with fact for purposes of their judicial treatment because they share qualities of 
each.265 Like law, social facts are general, “produc[ing] principles applicable 
beyond particular instances.”266 Like facts, they are positive.267 Because either 
classification is plausible, Monahan and Walker opt for treating factual 
“authority” like legal “authority”: 
Treating empirical research as a source of authority rather than as a 
type of fact can provide the principled direction now lacking on the 
issue of whether judges should locate research independently. The 
analogy is plain: as courts are free to find legal precedents that the 
parties have not presented, they should also have the power to locate 
social science research through independent investigation.268 
But choosing to place social facts in the same category as law (by calling 
both “authority”) is a fallacy of equivocation: yes, they are authorities, but very 
different kinds.269 As Monahan and Walker recognize, law is an “ought” (it can 
be violated), but a social fact is an “is” (it cannot be violated).270 Social facts 
are descriptive; the authority they carry is that of truth. Law is prescriptive; its 
authority is backed by the police power of the state. While it is true that both 
law and social fact serve an authoritative function, this hardly means that 
judges, who are expert at finding, interpreting, and applying legal authority 
independently, are equally adept at doing so with social facts. Because most 
judges are not trained in the social sciences, they need the assistance of 
experts.271 And because judges are not immune to bias,272 the adversarial 
system is there to ensure that the best arguments on both sides of a disputed 
issue of social fact are fully presented, and that each side is fully cross-
 
264. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 179 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
265. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 493 & n.43. 
266. Id. at 490. 
267. Id. at 489. 
268. Id. at 497. 
269. David Faigman eloquently describes these differences in his book, Constitutional 
Fictions. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 178. 
270. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 489. 
271. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 33. 
272. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 
9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012) (presenting empirical 
evidence suggesting bias against Muslims in federal court system). 
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examined.273 Monahan and Walker’s attempt to provide judges with guidelines 
for how properly to evaluate social facts in the course of their independent 
research does not answer why these facts should not be left to the same 
adversarial process we normally trust to uncover the truth. 
3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact 
Finally, the social facts exception is sometimes defended on the ground 
that social facts may present as mixed questions of law and fact. This 
apprehension is related to the “ultimate fact” concern that has at times animated 
the Court’s articulation of the constitutional fact doctrine.274 When social facts 
present as mixed questions of fact and law, ceding the question to the trial court 
can be seen as depriving the appellate court of its proper authority.275 This 
concern is a red herring, however, as it presents no different a question than 
arises with all mixed questions of fact and law, including some case-specific 
facts. For example, a mixed question of case-specific fact and law might be 
whether a statement was made with “actual malice.” A mixed statement of 
social fact and law might be whether a state’s abortion restriction imposes an 
“undue burden” on women seeking abortions. Each of these factual questions 
incorporates legal terms of art that sound factual but whose application to 
different fact patterns shapes the meaning of the legal test.276 Moreover, each is 
an “ultimate fact” in that the answer decides the legal issue in the case.277 
Mixed questions of law and fact, whether arising out of case-specific or social 
facts, pose the same conundrum: should appellate courts defer under Rule 
52(a)(6)? 
The Supreme Court does not have a consistent answer to this question. 
Notwithstanding the First Amendment cases in which it has exempted such 
 
273. It is these aspects of the adversarial system, including the existence of an impartial third 
party (the judge) to evaluate the factual assertions thus presented, that are missing from the legislative 
process of factfinding. See infra Part III.A. 
274. See supra Part I.B.3.  
275. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (“[T]he reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is 
held to embrace, and we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given course of conduct falls on the 
near or far side of the line of constitutional protection.”); A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic 
v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Th[e] admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an 
issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a 
single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects.”). 
276. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504–05 (1985) 
(discussing actual malice); Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. 
Bhagwat et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15–17, Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) 
(No. 05-1382) (discussing undue burden); see also Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 114–15 (“The line 
between adjudicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because decisionmakers use even the 
most particularized facts to make legal rules. For instance, courts may treat adjudicative facts as 
exemplary of the effects of legal rules.”). 
277. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 498–99; Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David L. 
Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 70–73, 
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-1382). 
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“ultimate facts” from the scope of Rule 52(a)(6), the Supreme Court has not 
always seen de novo review as necessary whenever a factual question is closely 
intertwined with a legal one. For example, in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 
the Court noted that “we have held that deferential review of mixed questions 
of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is ‘better 
positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that 
probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”278 
Whatever the solution to the “ultimate fact” dilemma, it should be the same for 
social and case-specific facts. There is no reason for the two to be treated 
differently. 
In any event, concern over “ultimate facts” cannot justify a broad 
exemption for all social facts. Most of the social fact questions trial courts 
routinely face are not mixed questions of law and fact or “ultimate facts.” They 
are legally relevant, helping the court decide whether or not a law is 
constitutional by shedding light on both the government’s factual justifications 
for the law and the alleged harm the law will cause. But the facts and their legal 
significance can and should be kept separate: an appellate court can refuse to 
accept the legal conclusion that follows from a factual determination without 
rejecting the factual determination itself. Appellate courts often seem to forget 
this, interpreting their authority over lawmaking so expansively that they 
readily dismiss social facts out of hand rather than parsing them from the legal 
questions over which they do have rightful authority. For example, in the 
Supreme Court’s decision on the PBABA, the Court could have deferred to the 
trial courts’ findings that the intact D&E procedure offers safety advantages to 
abortion patients while disagreeing that denying women these advantages 
rendered the ban unconstitutional.279 While such a judgment could be criticized 
in light of prior abortion precedent,280 at least this shaping of the legal standard 
would fall more comfortably within a function belonging to the higher courts. It 
would also keep the Court from setting a troubling and amorphous standard of 
disregard for Rule 52(a)(6). 
E. Social Facts as Singular Facts 
As some of the previously discussed rationales have already 
demonstrated, many arguments in favor of a social facts exception presuppose 
that social facts are qualitatively different than case-specific facts. These 
arguments present social facts as singular, or exceptional. 
 
278. 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991). 
279. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 1011–12 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing, as to 
Nebraska’s similar ban, that added health risks to women from banning an abortion procedure do not 
necessarily justify need for health exception). 
280. See id. at 931 (majority opinion) (criticizing Justice Thomas’s argument as inconsistent 
with precedent). 
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Arguments about the exceptional nature of social facts have their root in 
Kenneth Culp Davis’s famous legislative/adjudicative classification. But 
Davis’s taxonomy is problematic. First, it creates an overly rigid distinction 
among facts. The classification posits a binary opposition: if a fact is not case-
specific, then it must form the basis for the creation of law or determination of 
policy, and vice versa. This ignores the close relationship between many 
legislative and adjudicative facts.281 For example, a court or legislature may 
find that a certain chemical causes cancer. A court may also find that this 
chemical caused a particular plaintiff’s cancer. The way the fact is used in each 
instance differs, but the underlying fact is essentially the same. The same type 
of technical or “other specialized” knowledge undergirds each factual claim. In 
fact, the very same expert would likely be called to testify as to each.282 A trial 
judge would be no worse equipped to evaluate the former than the latter. 
Second, Davis’s rigid taxonomy seems outcome-driven. Davis wants 
social facts to be treated like law, so he gives them a name that suggests that 
their use necessarily implicates lawmaking. He accepts that “adjudicative” 
(case-specific) facts should be subject to the Rules of Evidence, that is, not 
treated like law, so he labels them accordingly.283 Monahan and Walker 
insightfully critique Davis’s distinction between legislative and adjudicative 
facts. They argue that Davis assumed a distinction between fact and law, but 
then cleaved the category of “facts” into two, one (which he conveniently 
labeled “legislative facts”) so closely resembling “law” that it must be left for 
the courts to decide.284 
Davis does not adequately explain why social facts are to be treated like 
law, however. One reason he gives is that the Supreme Court and appellate 
courts have traditionally treated social facts differently from case-specific 
facts.285 He also argues that it would be “inconvenient” to treat social facts like 
 
281. Cf. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 146 (pointing out that, under Davis’s taxonomy, “[t]he 
very same fact might be described as adjudicative, because it was part of a jury’s deliberations, and 
legislative, because a lawmaker used it to form or interpret the law”). Commentators have come up 
with additional categories of facts to try to capture the gray areas between Davis’s black-and-white 
categories. For example, Monahan and Walker offer the concept of “social frameworks” which are 
social facts used as the basis for establishing case-specific facts. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563–70 (1987). 
282. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142–45 (1999) (describing mixed 
set of social and case-specific facts regarding what caused plaintiff’s tire to blow out, for which 
plaintiffs intended to rely on a single expert). 
283. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 199, at 941. 
284. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 485; see also supra note 53 and accompanying 
text. However, Monahan and Walker employ a similar maneuver. After identifying important 
weaknesses in Davis’s approach, they too make a question-begging categorization by deciding to treat 
empirical research as “social authority” (akin to law), even as they acknowledge that it could plausibly 
be categorized either as law or as fact. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 488–93. 
285. Davis, supra note 7, at 403 (“[C]ourts have generally treated legislative facts differently 
from adjudicative facts, even though the distinction has not been clearly articulated and explanations 
have been beclouded by an erroneous use of the concept of judicial notice.”). 
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case-specific facts: “The reason we allow judicial notice to be taken of extra-
record [social] facts is . . . to promote convenience. Tribunals make factual 
assumptions because it is convenient to do so. Indeed, to fail to make factual 
assumptions would mean extreme inconvenience.”286 But the mere fact that 
something has always been done a certain way, or that it is convenient, cannot 
alone justify continuing on the same course. As Monahan and Walker point out, 
“the jurisprudential underpinning of Davis’s position on independent judicial 
investigation of legislative facts is surprisingly weak.”287 
The advisory committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 fully 
adopts Davis’s dichotomy despite these problems. The note draws a bright-line 
distinction between facts “which have relevance to legal reasoning and the 
lawmaking process” (“legislative facts”) and “simply the facts of the particular 
case” (“adjudicative facts”).288 The note justifies exempting social facts from 
judicial notice requirements because these facts are by nature never “clearly 
indisputable.”289 As such, the note suggests, social facts cannot be subjected to 
formalized judicial notice treatment since indisputability is a requirement for 
such treatment. Yet, while case-specific facts that are not “clearly indisputable” 
are left to the adversarial process for resolution, the note to Rule 201 suggests 
that social facts are exempt from the adversarial process too.290 
If social facts are not subjected to the adversarial process of a trial, then 
there is no trial record against which to measure a trial judge’s conclusions of 
social fact. It follows that those findings of fact cannot be tested for clear error. 
Moreover, the advisory committee note specifically says that judges at all 
levels should be unconstrained by ordinary adversarial rules and processes 
when finding social facts. Thus, following the advisory committee note to its 
logical conclusion, appellate judges cannot be required to defer to district 
judges, and Rule 52(a)(6) cannot apply to social facts. If social facts cannot be 
clearly erroneous, someone has to be responsible for making the final 
determination, and the advisory committee’s approach simply assigns that 
responsibility to the highest reviewing court. The advisory committee seems to 
suggest that, as with law, there is discretion involved in deciding a question of 
social fact. It thus comes uneasily close to suggesting that there is no objective 
truth that can be discovered and tested.291 
 
286. Davis, supra note 145, at 93. 
287. Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 487. 
288. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note.  
289. Id. (“Facts most needed in thinking about difficult problems of law and policy have a way 
of being outside the domain of the clearly indisputable.”) (quoting Davis, supra note 145, at 82). 
290. Id. (stating that social facts should not be subject to “any requirement of formal findings 
at any level” and courts should merely “leave open the possibility of introducing evidence through 
regular channels in appropriate situations”) (emphases added). 
291. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 23–26 (describing, and disagreeing with, view that all 
scientific assertions are inherently subjective and normative); Shawn Lawrence Otto, America’s 
Science Problem, 307 SCI. AM. 62, 71 (2012) (criticizing “post-modernist” view that truth is relative 
and inherently subjective).  
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The idea that social facts cannot be tested for objective truth is 
incompatible with our system of justice, which is founded upon truth.292 
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson’s very conception of democracy assumes that “the 
world is knowable and that objective, empirical knowledge is the most 
equitable basis for public policy.”293 There is a current best view for social fact 
questions.294 Scientific claims, and perhaps social science claims in particular, 
are often hotly debated or clouded with uncertainty.295 But case-specific facts 
as straightforward as whether the defendant ran a red light are also subject to 
doubt. These latter facts often rely on memory, imperfect senses such as sight 
or hearing, and other factors that render certainty elusive. This should not be a 
license to give up on a search for truth, a search for which the adversary system 
was especially designed.296 The reality of uncertainty and the possibility of 
error should be openly addressed and reflected in legal standards that apportion 
the risk of error in accordance with constitutional values.297 This is a very 
different proposition than treating facts as so unknowable or untestable that the 
finality of an appellate court’s own assessment is the best we can hope for. 
III. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SOCIAL FACTS 
Having considered the rationales for the “clearly erroneous” standard and 
the exception for social facts and concluded that the exception is not justified, 
this Article next examines Rule 52(a)(6)’s application to social facts. Part III.A 
considers the overarching constitutional values that judicial factfinding and 
appellate review are meant to serve in constitutional rights cases. Part III.B 
proposes a framework for applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to social 
facts. It first identifies and sets aside some special categories of social “facts,” 
and then proposes what the “clearly erroneous” standard should look like as 
applied to constitutional social facts, offering factors that may point to gaps or 
clear error in trial courts’ factfinding. Finally, Part III.C addresses particular 
 
292. See, e.g., Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing 
“adversarial system’s search for truth”); Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 840 F.2d 26, 30–31 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasizing importance of adversarial system in “testing for truth”); United States v. 
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (asserting that “[t]ruth is the essential objective of our 
adversary system of justice”); Borgmann, supra note 76, at 53–56; Cooper, supra note 103, at 657 
(“[T]he matter [of factfinding] is treated as one of right and wrong, not one of discretion.”). 
293. Otto, supra note 291, at 71. 
294. See generally PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 1–53 (2003) 
(arguing for the objectivity of truth); GOLDMAN, supra note 186, at 41–68 (1999). Despite the fact that 
we may later discover scientific “truths” to have been mistaken, we must always strive for the best 
current view, just as we do with case-specific facts. The fact that generally applicable rules of law are 
based upon potentially shifting social facts simply means that we must build in a mechanism for 
revisiting such facts in the future. See generally Benjamin, supra note 143 (proposing how best to 
accommodate changing social facts in lawmaking). 
295. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 162. 
296. See supra note 292. 
297. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 162. 
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concerns raised by the possibility of lower court conflicts and divided expert 
opinion. 
A. Promoting Constitutional Values 
Because the exceptions to Rule 52(a)(6) are so ill-defined, they have been 
a source of great mischief. Courts seem to defer (or not) based on their own 
biases or whims rather than on a disclosed set of principles.298 There is no 
reason to think that this serves constitutional rights claimants, or the public, 
well. It also denies the parties notice and predictability and makes it hard for 
litigators to advocate effectively for their clients.299 
Judicial review of the social facts underlying laws challenged as 
unconstitutional must serve some purpose within our constitutional system. 
Otherwise, we should revert back to the idea of deferring to legislatures on 
facts underlying legislation, and courts should not bother reviewing social facts 
in constitutional cases.300 So, if courts are to review facts, we must first 
consider why. Many of the theories for reform in judicial factfinding have not 
made this case one way or the other. The proponents of these theories have 
urged improvement in how judges absorb facts, but they have not said toward 
what end.301 These arguments for reform skip over the reasons for judicial 
factfinding and jump straight to the problems raised by such factfinding. But 
without first clarifying the normative goals to be achieved by reform, we have 
no way to measure “improvement” in judicial factfinding processes.302 
Kenneth Culp Davis, for example, stresses that it is important for courts to 
get the social facts right in constitutional cases but he does not state to what 
end. Instead, he stresses the dubious capacity of both district courts and the 
Supreme Court to do a good job of finding social facts.303 By focusing on the 
potential downsides of judicial social factfinding, Davis’s analysis presents 
judicial social factfinding as fraught with peril and offers no affirmative vision 
of the good that judicial social factfinding should aim to advance.304 
Some commentators have argued that appellate courts are the more 
appropriate forum for finding social facts because other interested parties can 
 
298. See Anderson, supra note 262, at 1 (arguing that “empirical evidence suggests that the 
appellate courts routinely revisit factual determinations by the trial courts, although often not 
transparently, and that appellate courts do so on an ideological basis”). 
299. See Karst, supra note 9, at 109; Wright, supra note 106, at 782. 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
301. Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 123–24 (asserting that various scholars’ “claims that 
regularized reception of legislative facts will lead to better substantive decisions ultimately fails 
because of [these scholars’] own inability to tell us what is a good decision”). 
302. See id.  
303. Davis, supra note 199, at 940–42. 
304. Dean Alfange, Jr. more effectively presents such a vision. See Alfange, supra note 7, at 
637–39 (discussing federal courts’ “vital role” in ensuring justice, protecting constitutional rights, and 
legitimating governmental power, and describing the important role judicial social factfinding plays in 
this endeavor). 
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weigh in via amicus briefs.305 However, the proper forum for interest 
representation is the legislature.306 The judicial process is not designed to serve 
as a public opinion survey307 or to ensure that every perspective on the law is 
represented.308 This justification for appellate court factfinding again fails to 
explain why social factfinding must occur within the judicial branch at all. 
This Article urges that one of the most important functions of judicial 
factfinding in constitutional rights cases is to ensure that laws that infringe 
basic constitutional rights not do so based on a flimsy or flawed factual 
foundation. The federal courts serve as an important check on majoritarian 
oppression. While courts should not lightly overturn democratically passed 
laws, one of their critical roles is to protect individuals from having their 
constitutional rights unfairly restricted by the power of the majority.309 Part of 
this responsibility entails overturning laws premised on bias, misapprehension, 
or fear.310 Unlike a legislature,311 a court is responsible for neutral, balanced 
factfinding. The well-established adversarial process helps to ensure a level of 
integrity in the factfinding process that is missing in legislative deliberation.312 
Two aspects of Rule 52(a) help to further the federal courts’ duty to 
ensure that rights-infringing laws rest on a sound factual footing. The first is the 
 
305. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 100; cf. Gorod, supra note 19, at 69–70 (arguing for 
allowing more individuals to introduce social fact evidence at trial level by expanding standing rules 
rather than relying on amicus briefs submitted on appeal). 
306. See Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 125. 
307. See Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1217. 
308. See Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 125; cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (Justice Holmes asserting, in the context of the right to 
participate in a hearing to contest increase in valuation of taxable property, “[w]here a rule of conduct 
applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its 
adoption”). 
309. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 125 (constitutional rights cases balance the majority’s 
“legitimate power” to enact laws of its choosing against constitutionally protected rights of 
individuals); Alfange, supra note 7, at 638 (“[T]he judiciary remains a part of the policy making 
sphere of government with unique and inescapable responsibilities . . . [including] to insure that the 
legal system is always directed toward coincidence with the society’s best conceptions of justice, to 
legitimate governmental power when the public interest demands the exercise of that power, and to 
protect constitutional rights against needless incursions by government or, in some cases, 
individuals.”). 
310. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(cautioning against ready acceptance of a law’s factual basis in the face of widespread public fear and 
reminding that “[m]en feared witches and burnt women”); cf. Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 
F.2d 1111, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (in context of agency factfinding, noting courts’ important role in 
determining that law’s justifications “rest upon solid facts and a realistic appraisal of the danger rather 
than vague fears extrapolated beyond any foreseeable threat”). 
311. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 40–41 (discrediting the myth of superior legislative 
factfinding competence). 
312. Cf. Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1218 (“[E]ven as the Supreme Court moves to 
become a third legislative chamber by issuing general norms, it still remains a court. It looks like a 
court and acts like a court. Thus, there are certain institutional requirements that should be honored.”); 
see also infra notes 328–32. 
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rule’s requirement of written findings of fact.313 This requirement serves an 
important function in helping parties to challenge erroneous findings and 
reviewing courts to determine whether the district court’s findings are 
sufficiently supported by the evidence. As commentators have pointed out, the 
uncertainty surrounding judicial treatment of social facts means that courts, 
especially higher courts, often do not candidly disclose the social facts upon 
which they have relied in reaching their legal conclusions.314 If Rule 52(a) 
applies, trial judges must make their findings explicit.315 And once these 
findings are spelled out, the parties and the appellate court have a common 
starting point from which to frame their arguments and analysis.316 Judge 
Walker was both criticized and praised for his detailed findings on the 
California same-sex marriage ban,317 but all can agree that the findings made 
his analysis and conclusions transparent and provided a clear basis for appellate 
review.318 It is true that “[t]he express findings that accompany a case tried to a 
judge provide a basis for second-guessing a determination at the trial level that 
is not present when a jury brings in a general verdict.”319 But the “clearly 
erroneous” standard would still be far more deferential than independent 
review. Moreover, slightly closer scrutiny of social factfinding than jury 
factfinding should alleviate some of the concerns of commentators who are 
 
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1), (2). 
314. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 6. 
315. Interestingly, although the Supreme Court has intimated that Rule 52(a)(6) does not apply 
to social facts, district courts typically comply with the Rule’s requirement for written factual findings 
even as to issues of social fact. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (holding a trial to address “significant disputed factual questions” on same-sex marriage 
ban and issuing eighty findings of fact including social facts), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); 
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004) (holding trial to determine constitutionality of 
PBABA and issuing extensive findings of social fact), aff’d, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), overruled 
by Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 
957 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by Carhart II, 550 U.S. 
124; Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000) (upholding provisions of 1997 Vermont 
Campaign Finance Reform Act after ten-day trial and issuing findings of social fact), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), op. withdrawn, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28176 (2d Cir. 
2002); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting motion for preliminary injunction 
against provisions of the Communications Decency Act after extensive evidentiary hearings and 
issuing 123 findings of fact including social facts), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
316. See Jackson, supra note 37, at 5. 
317. Compare Edwin Meese III, Prop. 8 Ruling Ignores Precedent, Evidence, and Common 
Sense, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2010, at A15, with Lithwick, supra note 22. 
318. The Ninth Circuit panel reviewing Judge Walker’s decision, however, chose to sidestep 
the factual issues. See Perry, 671 F.3d 1052. 
319. Christie, supra note 105, at 53; see also Cooper, supra note 103, at 648–49 (explaining 
that “clearly erroneous” standard is less deferential than that applied to jury factfinding, as reflected in 
part by the requirement of written findings of fact). 
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concerned that excessive deference will undermine appellate courts’ authority 
over formulating generally applicable rules of law.320 
The second beneficial aspect of Rule 52(a) is the “clearly erroneous” 
standard. By requiring appellate deference to the trial court’s findings unless 
there is clear error, the “clearly erroneous” standard recognizes the adversarial 
process of a trial as the best way to answer disputed questions of fact.321 As 
discussed above,322 a trial provides a particularly helpful process for examining 
social facts. Compared with the legislative process, trials are much better suited 
to dispassionate and thorough social factfinding. 
Legislative factfinding is not set up to be evenhanded.323 Rather, it is 
unabashedly partisan.324 Whether in Congress or a state legislature, the 
controlling party usually has control over key aspects of the process, including 
the number of witnesses who will testify for each side. Moreover, people often 
forget that the only audience for this hearing on the facts is the legislative 
committee, which comprises a small fraction of those who will vote on the 
measure. Once the bill gets to the floor, deliberation consists of lawmakers 
giving partisan speeches for or against the measure. In addition, legislative 
factfinding does not include an impartial judge to evaluate the facts presented. 
Rather, the party in control acts as both advocate and judge. This system may 
be fine for determining what policy course is preferable. But when minority 
groups or constitutional rights are in danger of majoritarian oppression, this is 
exactly when the availability of judicial reexamination of the facts is critical.325 
Plaintiffs who challenge a law as unconstitutional seek a very different 
kind of hearing than what they had in the legislature, namely an impartial 
hearing on facts that the legislature may well have disregarded.326 These facts 
may undermine the stated rationale for the law, or they may demonstrate the 
law’s predicted harms to rights-holders. Institutional legitimacy and respect for 
democracy and separation of powers demand that factfinding at the judicial 
level serve a very different function than at the legislative level. Legislators, as 
representatives of the public, are presumed to know and act upon majoritarian 
 
320. See Cooper, supra note 103, at 649 (referring to two functions of the federal courts of 
appeals, “the correction of error in individual cases and the development of the law in ways that will 
guide future conduct and future litigation”). 
321. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 11; Jackson, supra note 37, at 2. 
322. See supra text accompanying notes 189–97. 
323. See Borgmann, supra note 19, at 639–46 (comparing relative factfinding capacities of 
legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts). 
324. See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1172–77 (2007) 
(reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005) and 
summarizing forces that produce inferior factfinding in the legislative realm). 
325. Faigman et al., supra note 175, at 84. 
326. See Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 406, 412 
(1968) (commenting that, in an adversary system, “as a prelude to the dispute being solved, the 
interested parties have the opportunity of adducing evidence (or proof) and making arguments to a 
disinterested and impartial arbiter who decides the case on the basis of this evidence and these 
arguments”).  
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demands. This is not the job of the courts.327 At their best, what courts—and in 
particular trial courts—do effectively is clear away the factual confusions sown 
by majoritarian passions and examine social issues impartially and 
deliberately.328 
The federal trial courts are better suited than appellate courts to this kind 
of careful, dispassionate review. A trial provides the opportunity for a full 
presentation of the factual claims on both sides and for a judge’s methodical 
evaluation of these claims.329 The parties are able to cross-examine the experts 
testifying on the other side. The judge generally allocates the amount of time 
needed to allow all of the evidence to be presented, which may take weeks or 
even months. The judge is able to assess the credibility of the experts by 
hearing their testimony in person and, if not satisfied by their answers, she may 
herself ask questions of the experts. The judge may employ her own, neutral 
expert to help her understand the information.330 Trial judges live and breathe a 
case in a way that legislatures and appellate judges do not.331 While this system 
cannot guarantee excellent factfinding, it presents the best possible conditions 
for it.332 
A trial cannot be replicated on appeal, however, and the “clearly 
erroneous” rule recognizes this.333 Repeating a full airing of factual issues on 
appeal would waste resources. There should be a single place where the “main 
event” happens. Then, a process for review is needed in the event things go 
wrong at the trial level. The established mechanism for this is appellate review 
for clear error. As discussed above, there is nothing in the rule or its history that 
says this standard should not be applied to social facts in constitutional rights 
cases.334 
In addition to promoting efficiency, the “clearly erroneous” standard 
reflects the relative structural capacities of trial and appellate courts. Appellate 
courts cannot claim to be better at factfinding than district courts.335 We have 
already examined the dangers of unpoliced, wide-ranging factfinding on appeal 
 
327. See Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 125. 
328. See Solove, supra note 245, at 1017–19. 
329. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 133 (describing district courts’ advantages in evaluating 
expert evidence). 
330. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
331. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal 
Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 251 (1991) (discussing 
“benefits of the trial judge’s having lived with the case over a sustained period”). 
332. Borgmann, supra note 19, at 41. 
333. Id. at 45 (arguing that “[t]he trial courts’ advantages in fact-finding are not all replicated 
at the appellate level”); see also Gorod, supra note 19, at 6 (arguing that “appellate courts’ failure to 
rigorously test their factual findings can undermine the quality of those findings”). 
334. See supra text accompanying notes 106–09. 
335. See Wright, supra note 106, at 781 (“If trial judges are carefully selected, as in the federal 
system, it is hard to think of any reason why they are more likely to make errors of judgment than are 
appellate judges.”). 
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or reliance on amicus briefs of dubious quality.336 Evidence is adduced at trial. 
We do not have a formal system for this at the appellate level, whether for case-
specific facts or social facts.337 Rule 52(a)(6) recognizes this in appointing the 
trial court as the authoritative factfinder. 
B. Rule 52(a)(6) and Social Facts 
Given the malleability of the “clearly erroneous” standard, one might 
wonder if courts need a social facts exception at all, and whether there is any 
benefit to be gained from eliminating it. After all, one might argue, where an 
appellate court disapproves of the trial court’s factfinding, it could simply 
characterize those findings as clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a)(6).338 Thus, 
the argument goes, appellate courts really need a social facts exception to Rule 
52(a)(6) only for those rare instances when they are willing to admit that a 
district court’s finding is reasonable, but nevertheless wish to disregard it.339 
This fairly cynical prediction, however, overlooks that a major problem 
with the social facts exception is its inscrutability. Courts applying the 
exception typically do not even openly acknowledge that they are doing so. 
Indeed, they often roam unapologetically far beyond the record without so 
much as a nod to the usual requirement for deference to the trial court’s 
findings.340 Moreover, the above argument assumes that appellate judges are 
devious in how they treat social facts. But it seems just as likely that judges are 
genuinely confused about what kind of deference a trial court’s social 
factfinding warrants.341 We should “assume that appellate judges do make a 
conscientious attempt to confine their review to that authorized by law, and 
that, so far as human frailties permit, they do not regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous merely because it differs from the finding they might themselves 
have made.”342 By holding appellate courts to a defined “clear error” standard, 
Rule 52(a)(6) encourages judicial accountability, even if it cannot guarantee it. 
When appellate courts apply the “clearly erroneous” standard, they must at 
 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 207–24. 
337. Commentators have offered a variety of possible structural reforms to improve the 
reception of social factfinding at the appellate level, but these are unlikely to be implemented any time 
soon. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 68–75 (proposing a variety of reforms including expanding 
the standing doctrine); Larsen, supra note 32, at 1263 (proposing that “either we shut down in house 
factfinding with stricter procedural rules, or we open up the evaluation of legislative fact to invite 
broader participation”); Monahan & Walker, supra note 53 (proposing relying exclusively on briefs 
and independent judicial research rather than expert testimony). 
338. Christie, supra note 105, at 26; Wright, supra note 106, at 770. 
339. Christie, supra note 105, at 26. 
340. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 32, at 1260 (describing how Justice Breyer “is candid about 
the fact that the Internet provides him a powerful new tool for gathering factual data, whether or not 
that data appears in the briefs”). 
341. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1237 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
342. Wright, supra note 106, at 770. 
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least contend with the trial record. If they choose to reject the trial court’s 
findings, they must explain their reasoning rather than simply ignore the 
findings.343 An understanding among federal judges that Rule 52(a)(6) applies 
to social facts will thus help guide courts and shine light on judicial use of 
social facts in constitutional decision making. 
1. Ultimate Facts and “Thick” Social Facts 
As we have seen, the boundary separating social facts from case-specific 
facts is not exactly crystalline. Indeed, the indistinct line between the two 
categories is part of the justification for applying a uniform standard of 
appellate review.344 Besides case-specific facts, two other types of factual 
questions are sometimes also confused with questions of “social fact”—mixed 
questions of law and fact (also known as “ultimate facts”),345 and normative 
judgments that masquerade as social facts. As to these, it is less clear that Rule 
52(a)(6) should apply. This Section considers these two categories of facts in 
turn and explains why. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has not established a clear rule for 
whether or when appellate courts should defer to trial courts’ findings of 
ultimate facts.346 Commentators likewise do not agree on whether deference is 
a good idea.347 For purposes of this Article, the important point is that there is 
no reason to treat ultimate social facts differently from ultimate case-specific 
facts. Both present the same potential concerns regarding appellate authority 
over lawmaking. Thus, any rule that does not call for de novo review or 
deference across the board must be justified on some ground other than the 
social versus case-specific nature of the facts. 
A second common area of confusion that arises when courts address 
issues of constitutional social fact is a blurring between normative judgments 
and empirical fact. The social fact questions in constitutional rights cases are 
often hot-button, controversial issues, and courts tend to overlook the extent to 
which what they label as “facts” are layered with moral opinion.348 Suzanne 
 
343. See Jackson, supra note 37, at 5. 
344. See supra Part I.A and text accompanying notes 281–82.  
345. “Ultimate facts” is usually used to reference mixed questions of law and case-specific 
facts, but the term can also describe mixed questions of law and social fact. See supra text 
accompanying notes 92–95. 
346. See supra notes 92–95; supra Part II.D.3. 
347. Compare Adamson, supra note 17 (arguing in favor of independent review) with Lee, 
supra note 331, at 290 (arguing in favor of “clearly erroneous” standard “except where such review 
would create meaningful precedent”). 
348. Some would argue that, to the extent a “fact” is normative, it would more accurately be 
treated like law. See, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 53, at 489 (“The principal similarity 
between social science research and fact is that both are positive—both concern the way the world is, 
with no necessary implications for the way the world ought to be. Both refer to the empirical reality 
that we infer from our senses, rather than to the value we impute to that reality. Law, in contrast, is 
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Goldberg calls these “thick facts.”349 Ideally, when addressing these kinds of 
facts, courts would expressly distinguish the plainly empirical (“thin”) facts 
from the moral judgments they draw from those facts. Clarifying these 
boundaries would encourage courts to “expose and defend the norms that shape 
their decisions.”350 In reality, courts rarely do this. A good clue for when an 
empirical fact has crossed over from thin to thick is when it incorporates a 
generalized appraisal of desirability: that something is good or bad, or that it 
produces benefits or harms. 
United States v. Virginia, which addressed an equal protection challenge 
to the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”), 
combined empirical questions of social fact with morally encumbered ones. In 
particular, the case concerned whether single-sex education is “beneficial.”351 
There may well be non-value-laden, subsidiary facts that would help to answer 
this question. For example, the district court referred to a study, “not 
questioned by any expert,” demonstrating that at single-sex colleges “[s]tudents 
of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty 
frequently, show larger increases in intellectual self-esteem and are more 
satisfied with practically all aspects of college experience (the sole exception is 
social life) compared with their counterparts in coeducational institutions.”352 
The broader question whether men or women “benefit” from a particular 
style of education, however, contains an undeniably normative aspect. The 
Supreme Court did not squarely address the “thick” nature of this question, but 
rather changed the subject.353 Justice Scalia, dissenting, reproached the majority 
for failing to apply Rule 52(a)(6) to the district court’s factfinding.354 But 
whether men and women ultimately “benefit” from single-sex education is 
hardly a straightforwardly empirical question. It is inextricably bound up with 
weighty judgments about gender roles and stereotypes and the meaning of 
 
normative. It does not describe how people do behave, but rather prescribes how they should 
behave.”). 
349. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and 
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1964–65 (2006). An example of such a “thick 
fact” is the assertion that “people with mental retardation are ‘socially inadequate’ and ‘manifestly 
unfit.’” Id. at 1965 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)). 
350. Id. at 1972. 
351. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“The record is 
replete with testimony that single gender education at the undergraduate level is beneficial to both 
males and females.”). 
352. Id. at 1412. The Supreme Court agreed that it was undisputed in the case that single-sex 
education affords pedagogical advantages to “at least some students.” United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 535 (1996). 
353. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535. The Court accepted the claim that single-sex 
education can carry benefits for some but asserted that “Virginia has not shown that VMI was 
established . . . with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational 
opportunities within the Commonwealth.” Id. 
354. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because it purported to accept that single-sex education 
can be “beneficial,” the Court took issue with Justice Scalia’s indictment. Id. at 535 n.8 (majority 
opinion) (“[T]he dissent sees fire where there is no flame.”). 
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equality.355 While the Supreme Court rightly deferred to many of the 
underlying “thin” facts found by the district court, for example that most 
women would not choose VMI’s “adversative training” approach,356 it properly 
reserved for itself the determination of whether these facts could justify sex 
discrimination. 
Miller v. Fenton is a rare case in which the Court acknowledged the 
confluence of norm and fact in constitutional adjudication. In Miller, the Court 
considered the standard for determining whether a confession was “voluntary.” 
While the underlying factual issue of voluntariness concerns “whether the 
defendant’s will was in fact overborne,” the Court explained that the 
admissibility of a confession turns equally on “whether the techniques for 
extracting the statements . . . are compatible with a system that presumes 
innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial 
means.”357 The Court pointed out that “[t]his hybrid quality of the voluntariness 
inquiry” subsumes “a ‘complex of values,’ [which] militates against treating 
the question as one of simple historical fact.”358 
Like in deciding the admissibility of a confession, the courts cannot avoid 
deciding many of the normative issues embedded in constitutional social facts. 
Thin facts alone cannot answer whether governmental action has violated 
individual constitutional rights.359 It is “the norms embedded in the ‘thick’ facts 
or associated with the ‘thin’ facts [that] do the explanatory work in 
adjudication.”360 Such social values change over time, and these evolving 
norms in turn affect the substantive meaning and scope of constitutional rights. 
It is important that the judicial system accommodate such transformation. If it 
did not, decisions like Brown v. Board of Education would not have been 
possible. Responsibility for developing the meaning of the Constitution over 
 
355. See Goldberg, supra note 349, at 1072 (distinguishing between empirical evidence of 
biological differences between men and women and legal distinctions that can permissibly be based 
upon such differences). See generally David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and 
the Essentialist Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135 (2009) (offering a critical analysis of the current 
trend toward single-sex education and the way in which it perpetuates gender essentialism and sex 
stereotyping). 
356. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542. The district court, for its part, admitted that 
“the VMI methodology could be used to educate women and, in fact, some women . . . may prefer the 
VMI methodology to the [state’s proffered alternative].” United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 
481 (W.D. Va. 1994). 
357. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). 
358. Id. 
359. See Goldberg, supra note 349, at 1972; see also Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 749 
n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (“The social sciences play an important role in many 
fields, including the law, but other unscientific values, interests and beliefs are transcendent.”). 
360. Goldberg, supra note 349, at 1974; see also FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 148 (“It can only 
very rarely be said that any particular rule would have been different if the facts had been 
different. . . . Constitutional doctrinal facts are almost invariably set forth as part of a litany of premises 
offered to support a rule or standard. Rarely do they stand alone, and when they do, they are often 
considered . . . as proxies for normative principles or values.”). 
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time must reside with the appellate courts.361 Besides, there is no particular 
additional expertise that trial courts bring to making these kinds of moral 
judgments. For these reasons, as with questions of law, appellate courts must 
retain independent review over the normative aspects of social fact questions, 
especially where constitutional rights are at stake. 
2. Applying the “Clearly Erroneous” Standard to Social Facts 
Having clarified the categories of facts that should not be subject to the 
“clearly erroneous” standard, this Article now turns to setting forth a 
framework for applying that standard to social facts in constitutional rights 
cases. This Section first reviews the fundamental purposes of judicial review 
generally, and appellate review specifically, in these cases. Focusing upon 
these purposes helps to show why the “clearly erroneous” standard is 
appropriate. This Section then offers some specific factors that appellate courts 
should apply to identify clear error below. 
Appellate courts applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to social facts 
should recall the overarching reasons for federal judicial review of the facts that 
underlie rights-encroaching laws, as well as the particular purposes of appellate 
review. As discussed above, a primary purpose of judicial fact review in 
constitutional rights challenges is to ensure that the legislature has taken action 
based upon a solid factual foundation and not upon bias, fear, or 
misunderstanding.362 The purposes of appellate review of the trial court’s 
factfinding in such cases are to ensure that justice is done in the case at hand by 
examining the factfinding for errors, and to ensure that any impact the social 
factfinding has on generally applicable rules of law is consistent with existing 
doctrine and constitutional principles.363 
In most cases, these purposes do not warrant a free-ranging appellate-
court inquiry into social facts not developed at trial. Rather, an appellate court’s 
focus in the first instance should be on the trial record. Appellate courts should 
consider appointing, when necessary, an expert to help the court understand 
technical concepts. But the courts should not permit these experts to introduce 
new evidence outside of the adversary process.364 Rule 52(a)(6)’s “clearly 
erroneous” standard serves to direct the appellate court’s attention to the trial 
record. This attention is helpful even if the appellate court ultimately disagrees 
with the trial court’s findings of fact, because it keeps the facts anchored in the 
 
361. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 331, at 247–48 (discussing proper role of appellate courts, 
including primary role of “maintaining doctrinal uniformity”). 
362. See supra notes 309–12. 
363. See Lee, supra note 331, at 247–49. 
364. Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 509, 550 (1974) (“What an appellate court needs, in my view, is an aide who is not a witness 
so much as a kind of hybrid between a master and a scientific law clerk, a scientific expert who might 
be available, at the call of the appellate court, not to give evidence or resolve factual or technical 
issues, but to advise a court so that it could better understand the record.”). 
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adversarial and gate-keeping processes that exist only in the trial court. It will 
also more likely prompt a remand in appropriate cases. 
In Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit 
conducted such review of a trial court’s findings of social fact. The issue in this 
case was whether participants in methadone maintenance programs are 
sufficiently likely to relapse to justify a blanket exclusion from employment by 
the New York City Transit Authority.365 The circuit court concluded, on the 
basis of the “one-sided record” before the district court, that the evidence 
supported the district judge’s finding that, “many former heroin addicts on 
methadone maintenance are employable and that identification of those who are 
employable is readily accomplished through regular personnel procedures.”366 
Since courts have not consistently applied Rule 52(a)(6) to social facts, 
there is no developed case law to help judges identify what trial conditions 
signal potential clear error in a trial court’s social factfinding. Notably, 
although the “clearly erroneous” standard is deferential, it is less deferential 
than the standard applied to jury factfinding.367 Given the important competing 
principles—individual rights versus the separation of powers—at stake when 
laws are challenged as unconstitutional, this somewhat closer review of the trial 
record is appropriate. Indeed, the “clearly erroneous” standard itself, assisted 
by some general guidelines or factors to help courts identify the presence or 
risk of clear error, can address many of the concerns raised in defense of a 
social facts exception. These factors can assist in clarifying when “a mistake 
has been committed,” thus helping to rein in Rule 52(a)(6)’s infamous 
malleability.368 
Appellate courts should look for signs of bias or carelessness, such as the 
district judge’s wholesale and uncritical adoption of one party’s proposed 
findings of fact.369 They should also be aware of fact patterns that present a 
heightened risk of unconscious judicial bias, including when a party exercises a 
controversial right (like abortion) or belongs to a group subject to widespread 
antipathy (such as Muslims).370 Reviewing courts should also be mindful of the 
factfinding problems that may arise from a lack of, or an imbalance in, parties’ 
resources.371 A related concern not necessarily tied to financial resources arises 
when counsel obviously lack relevant professional experience.372 
 
365. Beazer v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1977). 
366. Id. 
367. See Cooper, supra note 103, at 648–49. 
368. See id. 
369. Id. at 655 (describing case in which district court opinion was rendered two years after a 
six-day trial ended, and then only upon issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel entry of judgment, 
and where the district court then adopted much of one party’s proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions verbatim, including typographical errors and erroneous mathematical calculations). 
370. See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 272 (presenting empirical evidence of bias against 
Muslims in federal court system). 
371. Davis, supra note 51, at 1552–54, 1580 (discussing how lack of litigation resources can 
affect the presentation and judicial reception of key social facts). Peggy Davis focuses especially on 
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Another red flag that calls for closer review of the trial court record is 
when two or more trial court opinions (whether from the same jurisdiction or 
not) reach opposing conclusions on the same issue of fact.373 Similarly, 
appellate courts should look more closely at findings of fact that concern a 
hotly debated topic of social science on which there is evenly divided opinion 
among credible experts.374 The presence of these factors should prompt a closer 
review of the trial record to ensure that the record is complete or that the 
evidence supports the judge’s findings. 
Facts may also be insufficiently developed in the trial court because of the 
procedural posture of the case. Rule 52(a) requires written findings of fact for 
preliminary injunction hearings.375 But, as Edward Cooper acknowledges, 
“[t]he procedure leading to such interlocutory decisions . . . may be much less 
thorough than full trial procedure, and indeed may be nothing more than a 
contest of affidavits.”376 On the other hand, the appellate court has no 
advantage over the trial court in assessing the factfinding following such a 
hearing.377 Moreover, since the injunction is not permanent, mistakes of fact are 
generally not as troubling in these cases. However, because courts and lawyers 
often treat findings of social fact as precedential,378 appellate courts should 
review more carefully findings of fact decided at the preliminary injunction 
 
cases where plaintiffs seek individual, case-specific relief and where social facts play an important, but 
background, role. For example, where attorneys seeking to prevent removal of children from a parent’s 
custody have not presented evidence to counter the theory of so-called “psychological parent,” judges 
have tended to accept the psychological parent theory unquestioningly. Id. at 1552–53, 1594. These 
issues may arise less frequently in the context of constitutional challenges to statutes, where the entire 
case is based on social facts and the cases are likely to be litigated accordingly. 
372. Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1210, 1242 (pointing out that “[l]awyers are not 
fungible” and bring “varying degrees of competence” and experience to litigation). 
373. See infra Part III.C. 
374. Id. The mere presence of factual disagreement, however, should not necessarily cast 
doubt upon a judge’s factfinding favoring a rights claimant. Because the Supreme Court has rejected 
laws based on pure moral disapproval or animus, see, e.g., U. S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534–38 (1973); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), governments may manufacture post hoc 
factual justifications for laws clearly motivated by such hostility. These cases are often readily 
identifiable by the one-sidedness in the quantity and quality of the evidence. Judicial factfinding plays 
a critical role in revealing such factual “disagreements” for what they are. See generally Borgmann, 
supra note 19 (using case studies in three different contexts to illustrate this phenomenon); see, e.g., 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing one-sidedness of factual 
evidence in case addressing ban on same-sex marriage), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
375. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1), (2). Rule 52(a)(2) provides, “In granting or refusing an 
interlocutory injunction, the court must . . . state the findings and conclusions that support its action.” 
376. Cooper, supra note 103, at 656 (nevertheless arguing, with respect to case-specific facts, 
that “clearly erroneous” standard should apply to such hearings); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet 
Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]here is generally a reduced 
evidentiary standard in preliminary injunction motions . . . .”). 
377. See Cooper, supra note 103, at 656. 
378. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 236. 
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stage and should make clear in their opinions the preliminary nature of any 
such findings. 
Finally, because social facts are broad in nature and affect more than just 
the parties to a litigation, the parties may not present all of the facts needed to 
resolve a question of social fact. This is particularly so if the court is inclined to 
rule in a broader way than the parties litigating the case had originally 
envisioned.379 Whether appellate courts’ proactive broadening of issues is 
advisable is well beyond this Article’s scope, but certainly whenever the courts 
employ this tactic, they should remand the issue if possible and at the very least 
allow both parties the opportunity to brief the issue fully. 
Even if none of the above factors is at issue, courts might also consider 
closer review whenever a trial court’s factfinding disadvantages a constitutional 
rights claimant. Such a right-preferential approach to appellate review is in 
keeping with the important role courts play in safeguarding against majoritarian 
oppression.380 As David Faigman points out, in criminal cases, appellate courts 
only review verdicts that go against the defendant.381 One can imagine a similar 
standard of appellate review in which appellate courts only independently 
review facts supporting district court holdings that are detrimental to 
constitutional rights.382 Although trial judges are supposed to be neutral, they 
are of course not immune to the social forces that can produce biased or 
partisan factfinding.383 This fact alone may justify a rights-preferential 
approach as an extra safeguard against impermissible majoritarian 
encroachment on rights. In Bose, the Court emphasized the judiciary’s 
important role as rights protector; although the opinion addressed case-specific 
 
379. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 31–32 (discussing Citizens United as example of this 
phenomenon); Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1205 (discussing how, in light of the Justices’ 
suggestive questioning at oral arguments in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Times’s lawyer 
“apparently sensed the Court’s willingness to fashion a first amendment rule broader than the rule he 
had suggested” and subtly changed his position). 
380.  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (asserting that where a majority 
legislatively imposes burdens on itself to benefit a minority, the same strict scrutiny should not be 
applied as when the majority burdens the rights of a minority); Borgmann, supra note 19, at 38; Frank 
B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 
1699 (2008). 
381. FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 124. 
382. Id. at 125. Faigman posits, but ultimately rejects, a similar, hypothetical rights-
preferential approach for substantive review of civil jury verdicts. Id. 
383. See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 272, at 231 (“[T]he persistent uneasiness of many 
Americans about Islam and its followers appears to have filtered into the attitudes of such well-
educated and independent elites as federal judges.”); see also C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, 
POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 37 (1996) (contending that in federal district 
courts “partisan effects are concentrated primarily in the realm of civil rights and liberties, and that 
partisan polarization in this realm is increasing”). 
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rather than social facts, the Court clearly focused on whether the trial record 
contained sufficient evidence to support the deprivation of a right.384 
There are a number of routes through which a reviewing court may 
become aware of social facts missing from the trial record, including the 
court’s own knowledge or research, the parties’ briefing on appeal, amicus 
submissions, or a decision on the same issue from another jurisdiction. 
Appellate courts should continue to rely on these sources to identify gaps in the 
record even if Rule 52(a)(6) applies to social facts. The problem with the social 
facts exception is not the uncovering of new potential issues of fact on appeal 
but appellate courts’ haphazard and ex parte resolution of these issues. Too 
often, when appellate courts become aware of “missing” social facts, they 
arbitrarily decide how to fill in the gaps and do not feel compelled to remand 
the case.385 If the missing facts were case-specific, an appellate court would 
much more likely remand than try to resolve the issue itself. The same should 
occur with determinative social facts.386 If, upon review, the appellate court 
sees a need for more evidence on a matter crucial to its decision, it should 
remand for further development by the trial court or, if impracticable, ask the 
parties to brief the issue. The court should not rely ex parte on amicus briefs or 
its own research; however, with notice to the parties, some factual 
supplementation may be proper in cases of insufficient party resources or other 
significant barriers to a full development of the facts in the trial court. Extra-
record appellate court factfinding should generally be a last resort, however, 
given the unlikelihood that a court’s own research or amici’s typically partisan, 
unscreened submissions will be subjected to the appropriate vetting and 
deliberate weighing of the evidence that happens at trial. 
In deciding whether to issue a remand, the appellate court should consider 
whether the parties dispute the facts in question, whether a trial would help to 
develop the facts and test their validity, and whether the judgment is final. If 
 
384. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (“Judges, as 
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported 
by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’”). In Bose, the Court determined that de novo review 
of the actual malice question was appropriate. This Article, while supporting a rights-preferential, 
closer review of certain trial court findings, does not argue for de novo review because of the dangers 
that such unpoliced appellate-level factfinding presents. 
385. See Miller & Barron, supra note 74, at 1190–91. 
386. See id. at 1233–36 (suggesting “improving the method of dealing with the independent 
development of legislative fact and legal doctrine by the Supreme Court” by recommending that the 
Court remand to the trial court the issue whether to take notice of a particular question of social fact); 
see also Alfange, supra note 7, at 667–68 (defending value of Brandeis brief but conceding that, 
“[w]here an adequate trial of the facts is not held, . . . and the appellate courts find it necessary to be 
more fully informed on factual questions, a remand to the lower court for a more thorough trial would 
be entirely in order”). I qualify this suggestion by limiting it to “determinative” facts, recognizing that 
there are significant potential downsides to remands, including cost to litigants, delays in obtaining 
justice, and potential “infinite loops” of factfinding and appellate review. Benjamin, supra note 143, at 
330; see also supra text accompanying notes 225–29. 
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the decision is made on a preliminary injunction motion, then the lower court 
will have a chance to address the new facts before it issues its final ruling.387 At 
minimum, parties should be able to address any new facts introduced by the 
appellate court in briefs, for example to contest their legal significance. If there 
appears to be a legitimate dispute about the reliability or accuracy of the 
evidence, however, the balance tips toward a remand. 
This approach is not without precedent. The Supreme Court has, on 
occasion, implicitly recognized the superiority of trial court factfinding by 
remanding when trial court proceedings have not produced an adequate factual 
record for a final determination of a law’s constitutionality. In Borden’s Farm 
Products, Co. v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of 
factual support in determining whether the government violated individual 
constitutional rights.388 Because it lacked a sufficient evidentiary record to 
decide a key factual premise in the case—the effects on independent dealers of 
the government’s fixing of milk prices—the Court remanded for further factual 
development.389 The Borden Court stated, “We [have] held that 
before . . . questions of constitutional law, both novel and of far-reaching 
importance, [a]re passed upon by this Court, ‘the facts essential to their 
decision should be definitely found by the lower courts upon adequate 
evidence.’”390 Parties and trial courts that know to expect this process will do a 
better job of, respectively, presenting and resolving these social facts the first 
time around.391 
C. Lower Court Conflicts and Divided Expert Opinion 
One of the reasons commonly given for why appellate courts must review 
social facts independently is that trial courts may reach conflicting conclusions 
about the same factual issue. Because social facts apply beyond the case at 
hand, such inconsistency could be problematic,392 especially if district court 
findings differed within the same jurisdiction. Thus, it is sometimes argued that 
appellate courts can “impose uniformity within their jurisdictions by according 
 
387. As discussed above, the appellate court should make the preliminary nature of its findings 
clear so that future opinions do not treat them as precedential. 
388. 293 U.S. 194, 210–11 (1934). 
389. Id. at 213.  
390. Id. at 212 (quoting Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1927) 
(addressing the validity of city ordinance regulating motor traffic and remanding because lower courts 
had not made findings upon crucial questions of fact)). 
391. See Cooper, supra note 103, at 652 (“Parties who know that they will not have any 
significant second chance to convince another tribunal on the facts must take the initial trial 
seriously . . . . In like fashion, a judge who knows that the central responsibility of decision cannot be 
shared is likely to take the task of decision more seriously.”).  
392. See Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 749 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that it is generally not tolerable that “identical conduct be constitutionally 
protected in one jurisdiction and illegal in another”). 
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no deference to a lower court’s record-based conclusions.”393 I argue, however, 
that the concern over conflicting lower court findings does not justify a general 
rule of de novo review of social facts. 
Where two or more district courts reach conflicting conclusions, this 
conflict warrants (indeed, requires) a more searching review of the facts. Even 
then, however, the appellate court is not justified in abandoning the record and 
embarking on a freewheeling search for evidence. Instead, the court should 
begin by reviewing the proceedings below to determine if deficiencies in the 
process might have accounted for the difference. For example, did a party in 
one of the cases lack the resources to litigate the case competently? How many 
experts appeared and was there overlap in expert witnesses between the two 
cases? What documentary evidence did each district judge consider? These 
kinds of questions might reveal the appropriateness of deferring to one court’s 
finding over the other, without necessitating a de novo review of the facts or 
warranting the appellate court’s reliance on wholly other sources of “facts,” 
such as amicus briefs or Internet searches. 
The risk of conflicting social factfinding across jurisdictions may be 
overstated, however. When parties challenge state laws as violating the federal 
Constitution, conflicting trial court factfinding may often be less likely, 
depending on the nature of the law and the constitutional claim.394 If the 
constitutional claim is highly dependent on how the law is worded and how that 
wording implicates conditions specific to the state, the district court’s 
factfinding, although addressing social facts, will likely be of little relevance 
beyond the state’s borders. For example, a state may tailor restrictions on 
campaign expenditures to its particular history of campaign finance 
regulation.395 A district court’s factfinding detailing this history will be relevant 
to that state, but not another.396 
 
393. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
394. If multiple lawsuits are filed against a single state law, the cases will likely be 
consolidated. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a); see, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (D. Vt. 
2000), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), op. withdrawn, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28176 (2d Cir. 2002). 
395. See, e.g., Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (noting that “the constitutionality of some 
provisions of Act 64 depends heavily on facts,” including “a substantial amount of background 
concerning the history of campaign finance regulation in Vermont”); see also W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. 
v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2011) (explaining that Montana’s campaign finance law “cannot 
be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted, during the early twentieth 
century”). 
396. Unfortunately, reviewing courts often treat such state-specific factfinding as precedential, 
making it impossible for constitutional rights claimants to overcome a bad result in a different 
jurisdiction with new and more germane facts. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic 
v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (criticizing this phenomenon 
in context of mandatory delays for abortion); cf. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 
2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (reversing Montana Supreme Court’s ruling upholding state’s 
campaign finance law, and declaring that facts concerning Montana’s unique history “fail to 
meaningfully distinguish” Citizens United). 
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In some cases, however, the threat of conflicting findings of social fact is 
real. States sometimes pass cookie-cutter versions of a model statute for which 
the relevant social facts are general rather than particular to each state. For 
example, in the “partial-birth abortion” cases, one issue addressed by the 
lawsuits was the relative safety of different abortion procedures and the risks of 
banning one or more of these methods.397 In such cases, district courts ruling on 
different state laws may address virtually identical questions of social fact.398 
The risk of conflicting factual findings is at its height when multiple district 
courts address challenges to a single federal or state statute.399 Yet independent 
appellate review would not guarantee uniformity across jurisdicitons and thus 
would not solve the problem of trial courts’ conflicting findings of social fact. 
Issues of law are reviewed de novo, yet circuit splits occur routinely on such 
questions. 
When an appellate court faces contradictory district court findings, or 
when credible experts are truly divided on a key issue of social fact, the 
appellate court confronts a choice. However it makes that choice, it will 
necessarily allocate the risk of error. This allocation should be done according 
to constitutional norms that the federal courts are entrusted to enforce.400 An 
approach consistent with such norms would be for the appellate court to err on 
the side of the rights claimant. This rights-preferential thumb on the scales 
makes sense given the judiciary’s important role in protecting individual 
constitutional rights against majoritarian oppression.401 This was the approach 
that the Court took in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, where 
the Court found that competing psychological studies were insufficient to 
support a predictive judgment linking violent video games and acts of 
aggression.402 The Court took a similar approach in Stenberg v. Carhart, erring 
on the side of plaintiffs challenging a “partial-birth abortion” ban in reviewing 
evidence addressing the safety advantages of certain abortion procedures.403 
 
397. See, e.g., Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
398. See id.  
399. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–81 (2012) 
(describing the multiple challenges to the Affordable Care Act). 
400. See FAIGMAN, supra note 32, at 171 (“Very often in constitutional cases too little will be 
known about relevant reviewable facts. When this is so, the normative principles of the Constitution 
allocate the risk of error.”). 
 401. Some scholars have advocated such a rights-preferential approach for judicial review of 
legislation. See supra note 380; see also Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism 1, 8–9 
(Vanderbilt University Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 13-3, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2213372## (arguing that federal 
courts should err on side of judicial activism in striking down statutes, in light of judiciary’s anti-
majoritarian role in checking popular tyranny and passions). 
402. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011) (acknowledging that the Court took a different approach 
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), because that case applied 
intermediate scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation, rather than strict scrutiny). 
403. Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 936–37 (2000) (“The upshot is a District Court finding that 
D&X significantly obviates health risks in certain circumstances, a highly plausible record-based 
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In Lockhart, the Supreme Court took the opposite approach, ruling against 
a capital defendant and rejecting the trial court’s findings, based on the Court’s 
independent assessment that relevant social science authority was divided.404 
The Court reviewed in detail (and apparently de novo) the district court’s 
findings that death-qualified juries are more prone than non-death-qualified 
juries to find in favor of a death sentence. After six pages of probing 
examination of the evidence,405 the Court disingenuously dismissed the 
relevance of this evidence to its analysis, declaring, 
Having identified some of the more serious problems with McCree’s 
studies, however, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the 
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that 
“death qualification” in fact produces juries somewhat more 
“conviction-prone” than “non-death-qualified” juries. We hold, 
nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from 
“death qualifying” juries in capital cases.406 
Even after this searching review, the Court found only disagreement or 
uncertainty among experts on the issue.407 If, following a review for clear error, 
a court finds that social science evidence is essentially tied on a determinative 
issue, the Court should generally err in favor of protecting constitutional 
rights.408 This is especially true in a case like Lockhart, where the claimant’s 
life hangs in the balance. 
On the other hand, when a court faces multiple lower-court decisions that 
agree on key social facts underlying a particular legal issue, that agreement 
weighs heavily in favor of deference to the lower courts’ factfinding. This is 
especially so if the factfinding contradicts the legislatures’ factfinding, because 
one might more likely expect trial courts to defer to legislatures. Accordant 
findings by courts across the country contradicting multiple legislatures’ 
factfinding on a hot-button issue is a reliable indicator that prejudice, fear, or 
other emotions drove the legislative agenda.409 This was so in the context of 
bans on violent video games and on “partial-birth abortion.”410 
 
explanation of why that might be so, a division of opinion among some medical experts over whether 
D&X is generally safer, and an absence of controlled medical studies that would help answer these 
medical questions. Given these medically related evidentiary circumstances, we believe the law 
requires a health exception.”). The Court took the opposite approach in Gonzales v. Carhart when it 
upheld the federal PBABA. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
404. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168–73 (1985); see supra text accompanying note 
128. 
405. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168–73. 
406. Id. at 173; see also FAIGMAN, supra note 32 (commenting on cases in which the Supreme 
Court has critiqued and discounted social science evidence while then declaring the evidence irrelevant 
and purporting to assume its validity). 
407. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 169–73 & n.11. 
408. See supra note 380 (citing authority for rights-preferential approach). 
409. See generally Borgmann, supra note 19. 
410. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734, 2737–38 (2011) 
(addressing the constitutionality of ban on violent video games, discussing emotions raised by violent 
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In sum, applying de novo review to all findings of social fact because of 
occasional conflicts among lower court decisions presents a cure that is worse 
than the disease, inviting unpoliced appellate-level factfinding for all cases, 
even where lower court factfinding is consistent. The much more targeted 
approach outlined in Part III.B can adequately address the problems raised by 
conflicting trial court social factfinding. 
CONCLUSION 
Social facts have become an intrinsic part of the fabric of constitutional 
rights decision making. It is unpardonable that the Supreme Court has not 
established a principled, explicit framework for the judicial reception and 
evaluation of such facts. This is especially so since the well-established 
mechanism for appellate review of trial court factfinding, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a)(6), by its terms encompasses social facts and could easily be 
applied to them. Judicial review of the social facts underlying laws that restrict 
basic rights serves the critical function of protecting against majoritarian 
oppression. As such, its primary purpose should be a search for truth, a purpose 
quite different from that which motivates legislative factfinding. The best way 
to ensure that facts are examined dispassionately and deliberately is through the 
adversarial process of a trial. Where such facts are determinative of a law’s 
constitutionality, trial courts should hold trials testing the facts, and their 
findings should receive a presumption of finality. To the extent that social facts 
raise special concerns, for example because of their precedential impact, the 
framework of the “clearly erroneous” standard can readily address these 
concerns. This straightforward approach promotes fairness, predictability, 
regard for factual integrity, and the safeguarding of constitutional rights. 
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